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PUBLIC REGULATION OF THE OIL
AND GAS INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA:
AN EVALUATION
DR. EGHOSA OSA EKHATOR*
ABSTRACT
Nigeria operates a command and control regulatory framework in the oil
and gas sector.1  This type of regulation was prevalent in the United
States and Britain during the 1970s and 1980s.2 Under this regulatory
framework, regulators are deemed to be acting in the public interest. This
article focuses on the extant public regulatory regime in the oil and gas
sector in Nigeria. Generally, factors, such as red-tape, over-regulation
and regulatory capture, amongst others, are some reasons militating
against a command and control regulatory regime.3 This article will con-
tend that unless there is a paradigmatic shift in the state-oriented or pub-
lic regulatory framework in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria, the
fundamental ills or malaise afflicting the industry will not abate.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the various legislative enactments governing the
oil and gas regime in Nigeria. Laws regulating the oil industry directly
* Eghosa Osa Ekhator, LL.B. (Benin), LL.M. (Hull), M.Sc. (Hull), B.L. (Abuja), Ph.D.
(Hull).
1. Evaristus Oshionebo, Transnational Corporation, Civil Society and Social Responsibility in
Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Industry, 15 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107-129 (2007).
2. R. Robert Baldwin, Is Regulation Right, Centre of Risk and Regulation at the London
School of Economics and Political Science 1-5 (2000), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35976/1/IsRegula-
tionRight.pdf.
3. Id.
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and other incidental laws and regulations will be analyzed. This article
will be divided into six major sections for coherence. The first part
dwells on the ownership and control of the oil and gas resources in Nige-
ria. This section will serve as an introduction to the oil and gas industry
in Nigeria with its attendant political and socio-economic problems of
the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region. A historical evolution of the
ownership of oil and mineral resources in Nigeria will also be in focus.
The second part of the article will focus on the public regulation of the
oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The legislative framework regulating the
Nigerian oil industry, including the Constitution of Nigeria 1999, Land
Use Act,4 Petroleum Act,5 Associated Gas Re-injection Act,6 Environ-
mental Impact Assessment Act (EIA),7 Oil Pipelines Act,8 Petroleum
Act,9 Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act,10 Harmful Waste (Special Crimi-
nal Provisions) Act11 and Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regula-
tions, amongst others, will be in focus.
The third part of this article will analyze the laws on gas flaring in the oil
and gas sector in Nigeria.
The fourth part of this article will highlight the environmental impact
assessment regime in Nigeria and analyze its effectiveness.
The fifth section will highlight the recent developments in the oil and gas
industry, such as the Petroleum Industry Bill and the Local Content Act.
The sixth part will conclude the analysis, where the inherent weaknesses
of the aforementioned laws and regulations will be brought to the fore.
II. THEORIES OF OWNERSHIP OF OIL
This section analyzes the various ownership theories and the ownership
of oil and mineral resources in Nigeria. There are various strands of own-
ership of oil theories prevailing in different countries. Ownership rights
4. Now Land Use Act (2004) Cap. (202), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria [hereinafter
LFN].
5. Petroleum Act (2004) Cap. (P10), LFN.
6. Associated Gas Re-Injection Act (2004) Cap. (20), LFN.
7. Environmental Impact Assessment Act (2004) Cap. (E12), LFN.
8. Oil Pipelines Act (2004) Cap. (07), LFN.
9. Petroleum Act (2004) Cap. (P10), LFN.
10. Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act (2004) Cap. (H5), LFN.
11. Harmful Waste Act (2004) Cap. (H1), LFN.
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over oil are dependent on a number of factors or conditions,12 such as
“the political system in place at the time of the determination and the
instrumentality of the law”13 in any country. For example, in the United
States, individuals can own the minerals situated on their lands. This is
not the case in communist or socialist countries (for example, Cuba and
North Korea) where individual ownership of property is stringently con-
trolled by the State. The latter scenario is akin to the situation in Nigeria
where most of the oil-related laws were promulgated by military re-
gimes, which are typically unitary in nature and tend to be socialist or
centrist inclined. Indeed, Nigeria’s military rulers were at the forefront of
centralising the ownership and control of oil and gas resources in the
federal government of Nigeria.14
Generally, ownership of oil theories can be subsumed into different cate-
gories.15 These categories include the domanial legal system theory of
ownership, private ownership theory (which includes qualified owner-
ship theory and absolute ownership theory) and State (or permanent) sov-
ereignty over mineral resources under international law.16 These various
theories can also be subsumed under two strands of resolving ownership
of mineral or oil and gas resources. These major strands of ownership of
natural or mineral resources located under land, such as petroleum are
present when:
(1) The mineral resources can be said to belong to the land
owner; or
(2) The mineral resources belong to the State or either the fed-
erating part or part of the State where the resources are lo-
cated, such as the province, state or local government.17
12. Francisca Nlerum, Reflections on Participation Regimes in Nigeria’s Oil Sector, NIGERIAN
CURRENT L. REV. 145, 149 (2007-2010), available at http://nials-nigeria.org/pub/NCLR5.pdf.
13. Id.
14. For example, the Petroleum Decree (now Act) was enacted by the military administration
of General Yakubu Gowon in 1969 during the course of the Nigerian-Biafra Civil War.
15. For an overview of the different categories of ownership theories, see Lanre Aladeitan,
Powering the Future: 21st Century Guide for Energy Practitioners: Ownership and Control of Oil,
Gas, and Mineral Resources in Nigeria: Between Legality and Legitimacy, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
159, 160-8 (2013).
16. See YINKA OMOROGBE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN NIGERIA: SIMPLIFIED 31 (Malthouse Press
2001); Yinka Omorogbe & Peter Oniemola, Property Rights in Oil and Gas Under Domanial Re-
gimes, in PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES (A. McHarg ed., OUP
2010); Nlerum, supra note 12, at 149.
17. Omorogbe & Oniemola at 119.
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The first ownership theory in focus will be domanial or state ownership
of natural resources. Simply, ownership of mineral resources can either
belong to the owner of the land (wherein the mineral is situated) or to the
State (which might be the part of the state, region or the local govern-
ment wherein the mineral is situated).18 The domanial system encom-
passes the vesting of ownership rights over mineral resources in the
sovereign or State.19 The origin of the domanial system is traced to the
regalian system under Roman law.20 During the Roman Empire (after the
Punic War), the State (Roman Empire) became the owner of all the con-
quered territories and ownership of mineral resources was vested in the
sovereign.21 An example of a country with a domanial legal system is the
United Kingdom, where the ownership of oil and gas is vested in the
Crown by virtue of the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 (now Petroleum
Act 1998). Iran, the Kingdom of Kuwait, Papua New Guinea, Bulgaria,
Ukraine, Bangladesh and Mozambique are additional examples of coun-
tries with a domanial legal system in the ownership of mineral re-
sources.22 Nigeria’s domanial legal system of ownership of mineral
resources is established by the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution,
Petroleum Act and Exclusive Economic Zone Act, amongst other stat-
utes, which vest the exclusive ownership of mineral resources in the fed-
eral government of Nigeria. These statutes will be elucidated upon in this
article in the section on public (statutory) regulation of the oil and gas
industry in Nigeria.
The two variants of private ownership of mineral resources are absolute
and qualified ownership models. In absolute ownership theory, the land
owner has exclusive ownership of the oil found in his land. However, the
possessory interest in the minerals beneath a land is subject to the rule of
capture.23 The rule of capture entails the loss of rights to oil on a land by
the land owner when the oil migrates to an adjoining land wherein it is
produced.24 The U.S. states of Texas, Pennsylvania and Arkansas are
places where absolute ownership theory is the norm.25
18. Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra note 16.
19. Nlerum, supra note 12.
20. Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra note 16.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. For an extensive analysis of the ownership of oil theory operational in Texas, see Emeka
Duruigbo, Realizing the People’s Right to Natural Resources, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L REL.
111, 118-20 (2011).
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Private ownership of mineral resources is the prevailing model in the
United States. Under qualified ownership in the United States, the land
owner is “said not [to] have title to the oil and gas in situ because of the
fact that he can be divested by drainage without consent and without any
liability on the part of the person causing the damage.”26 The land owner
has a property interest in the land rather than a right of capture.27 This
theory is prevalent in California and Indiana. There, various exploration
and prospecting rights are granted through the instrumentality of leases
between the land owner and the mining company.28 In the case of a com-
mon reservoir, the land owners are designated as collective owners with
the same rights to prospect or take oil from the reservoir. Thus, the land
owner has a qualified interest in the mineral resource arising from being
one of the collective owners of the reservoir.29 In Elliff v. Texon Drilling
Co.,30 the court held that the owner of a piece of land acquires title to the
oil being produced on the land notwithstanding some parts of the oil that
may have migrated from adjoining lands.31
Some international instruments have promoted the ownership of mineral
or natural resources. For example, the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution No. 626 (VII), which was adopted in 1952, states that “the
right of people freely to use and exploit their natural resources is inherent
in their sovereignty.” Also, in 1962, the General Assembly adopted Res-
olution 1803 (XVII) (Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources),
which provides for inter alia:
the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over
their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the in-
terests of their national development and of the well-being of
the people of the state concerned.
In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution No.
3281 (XXIX). Article 2 of the resolution states that “every state has and
shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession,
use and disposal, over its wealth, natural resources and economic activi-
ties.”32 Also, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
26. OMOROGBE, supra note 16, at 32.
27. Id.
28. Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra note 16.
29. Id.
30. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 575 (Tex. 1948).
31. Nlerum, supra note 12, at 150.
32. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), art. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (Dec. 12, 1974).
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(OPEC), in its Resolution XVI ‘Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Pol-
icy in Member Countries,’ recommended that members should take ac-
tive participation in and control over the oil and gas operations in their
countries.33
Presently, this is no longer the prevailing slant of many developing coun-
tries. It can be argued that many developing countries now engage in the
classical ‘race to the bottom’ syndrome to attract foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI)34 in order to stimulate economic growth, employment and
investment, amongst others. The ‘race to the bottom’ theory can manifest
when “a country lowers its standards in order to gain competitive advan-
tage over a foreign exporter.”35 ‘Race to the bottom’ syndrome also oc-
curs when a country (in most instances, a developing one) has a weak
regulatory regime in controlling foreign direct investment or the activi-
ties of multinational corporations, thereby permitting the continuation of
poor labour standards in the country,36 amongst others. Nigeria exempli-
fies a country engaged in the ‘race to the bottom’ theory to attract FDI,
especially in the oil and gas industry. It is argued that by having a weak
regulatory regime in the oil and gas sector, the Nigerian government is
attracting foreign direct investment via the instrumentality of the foreign
oil multinational corporations (MNCs) that operate in the sector.37 On
the other hand, it is contended that the weak regulatory regime and at-
tendant challenges in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria serve as a disin-
centive to foreign direct investment.38 Due to the inability of the
Nigerian government to properly regulate the oil and gas sector, espe-
cially against the negative consequences of oil related activities by
MNCs, foreign investors are now exposed to various risks occasioned by
the hostility of the host communities.39 Some of these risks include hos-
33. Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra note 16.
34. Eghosa Ekhator, Regulation of Labour Standards: An International Perspective, 2 J.
GLOBALISATION & DEV. AFR. 11 (2009).
35. Kofi Addo, The Correlation Between Labour Standards and International Trade, 36 J.
WORLD TRADE 285, 291 (2002).
36. Ekhator, supra note 34.
37. See Access to Justice: Human Rights Abuse involving Corporations in Nigeria, Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists, 1-3 (2012), http://documents.icj.org/Nigeria.pdf (arguing that due to
successive governments’ economic policies in Nigeria which promoted FDI by foreign MNCs has
led to the permissive nature of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria where some MNCs commit human
rights abuse and environmental abuses during the course of their operations) [hereinafter Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists]. Also see MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 53-55 (Cambridge Univ. Press 3d ed. 2010), for an analysis of the
dependency theory in FDI.
38. George Akpan, The Failure of Environmental Governance and Implications for Foreign
Investors and Host States- A Study of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, 1 INT’L ENERGY L. &
TAX’N REV. 1 (2006).
39. Id.
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tage taking of oil MNCs staff, sabotage of oil installations, armed rebel-
lion, and activities of NGOs in highlighting the negative impacts of oil
related activities amongst others.
According to Omorogbe and Oniemola from the aforementioned United
Nations resolutions, there is a definite trend from the individual owner-
ship of mineral rights to (host) State ownership or control of natural or
mineral resources40 in different countries. This was especially so in some
developing countries wherein oil MNCs are seen as agents of doom and
unequal partners in the economic development of such countries. This
view was prevalent in the 1970s and early 1980s and may have been
influenced by the subsisting view that the developing countries sought a
change in international law via the instrumentality of the New Economic
Order.41 Presently, however,  many of the member countries of the New
Economic Order bloc that were at the forefront of state ownership of
mineral resources remain mired in economic problems and their expected
integration into the global or international economic system have been
fraught with difficulties.42 However, the position advocated by Omo-
rogbe and Oniemola on permanent sovereignty of mineral resources can
be criticized on the basis that “ownership and control of natural resources
under the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
is a provision that guarantees a Nation’s right to exclusive control over
its natural resources against another State and not one that deals with
intra-national ownership and control interests.”43 Thus, the question at
this juncture is: in the context of the State’s total ownership and control
of oil and gas resources in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, is the Niger-
ian State a developer of the resources for public good?
In Nigeria, the federal government owns and controls the ownership of
mineral resources. Laws, such as the Constitution of Nigeria, the Land
Use Act and Petroleum Act, amongst others, vest the total ownership and
control of mineral resources in the federal government to the detriment
of the states, local governments and the local communities wherein the
mineral resources are situated. One plausible argument for the federal
government’s ownership of mineral resources is that the minerals (oil
and gas included) in or upon any land in Nigeria “are viewed by the state
40. OMOROGBE, supra note 16, at 37.
41. SORNARAJAH, supra note 37.
42. Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in
International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33 (2006).
43. Rhuks Ako, Resource Control or Revenue Allocation: The Path to Sustainable Peace in
Nigeria’s Oil-Producing Communities, Paper Presented at the Nigerian Society of International Law
35th Annual Conference 4 (June 2005).
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as public goods and government’s intervention in their exploitation be-
comes simply a case of public use.”44 That is, the mineral resources are
managed or held in trust on behalf of the Nigerian people by the federal
government for the benefit and development of the country.
However, it is the general consensus that ownership of mineral resources
by the federal government has been detrimental to the people of the oil
producing areas of Nigeria. Itse Sagay is in support of this view and he
states thus:
Regarding the danger of private ownership of oil creating enor-
mous wealth for a few people who would then misuse these
funds, the question may be asked: Has central ownership and
control prevented the emergence of a class of enormously
wealthy individuals in Nigeria? Have the proceeds of oil been
prudently and patriotically put to use? Regarding the country’s
extra sales of crude oil during the Gulf War alone, the Okigbo
Panel noted that some US$ 12.4 billion is yet to be properly
accounted for.45
Due to inherent weaknesses and corruption in the extant regulatory re-
gime in the oil and gas sector of Nigeria, scholars have advocated owner-
ship of mineral resources by the local communities or the indigenous
people wherein the oil is found.46 On the international plane, the various
justifications for the ownership of mineral resources by local communi-
ties or indigenous people may include a right to development, economic
self-determination, permanent sovereignty over mineral or natural re-
sources and the rights of the local communities or people to benefit from
the mineral resources, amongst others.47 An example of an international
convention that promotes the ownership and control of mineral resources
44. Wilson Akpan, Oil, People and the Environment: Understanding Land-Related Controver-
sies in Nigeria’s Oil Region, 5 (2010), http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/akpan.pdf.
45. Itse Sagay, Ownership and Control of Nigerian Petroleum Resources: A Legal Angle, in
NIGERIAN PETROLEUM BUSINESS HANDBOOK 180 (V.E. Erhonsele ed., Advent Communications Ltd.
1997).
46. KANIYE EBEKU, OIL AND THE NIGER DELTA, PEOPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW – RESOURCE
RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENTAL AND EQUITY ISSUE (Rudiger Koppe, 2006); Duruigbo, supra note 42; F.O
Ayodele-Akaakar, Appraising the Oil and Gas Laws: A Search For Enduring Legislation for the
Niger Delta Region, 3 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. AFR. 1, 7-8 (2001), http://www.jsd-africa.com/Jsda/
Fallwinter2001/articlespdf/ARC%20-%20APPRAISING%20THE%20OIL%20and%20Gas.pdf.
47. Dunia Zongwe, The Legal Justifications for a People-Based Approach to the Control of
Mineral Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Paper Presented at the Cornell Law
School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers Paper 12 (2008), http://scholar-
ship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=lps_clacp.
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is the Indigenous and Tribal People’s Convention 1989. Article 15 of the
Convention provides for the rights of the people to participate in the
management, use and conservation of mineral or natural resources. Also,
the Convention states that when the State has ownership and control of
the mineral resources, the government shall consult with the people
before undertaking any exploratory activities in such communities (Arti-
cle 15(2)). Unfortunately, Nigeria has yet to ratify this Convention. Ad-
ditionally, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (African
Charter), which has been domesticated into Nigerian law, bestows rights
upon the people to own and control natural resources.48 For example,
Section 1 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratifi-
cation and Enforcement) Act states that the African Charter shall “have
force of law in Nigeria and shall be given full recognition and effect and
be applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive
or judicial powers in Nigeria.”
Also, Article 21 of the African Charter provides that all peoples shall
have the right to freely dispose of their wealth and mineral or natural
resources. Notwithstanding the provisions of the International Conven-
tion of Indigenous and Peoples Rights and the African Charter, the fed-
eral government’s ownership and control of natural resources in Nigeria
is unscathed. In respect of the Indigenous and Tribal People’s Conven-
tion, Nigeria has yet to ratify it. By virtue of Section 12(1) of the Consti-
tution of Nigeria, no treaty shall have force in Nigeria except such a
treaty or convention that has been enacted into law by the National As-
sembly. Flowing from this premise, the Indigenous and Tribal People’s
Convention 1989 is not applicable in Nigeria. In respect of the African
Charter, it can be argued that the Charter promotes socio-economic
rights, which are not justiciable under Nigerian law. By virtue of Section
6(6)(c) of the Constitution, the objectives and principles discussed under
the heading of ‘Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State
Policy’ in Chapter II are neither justiciable nor enforceable.49 However,
there are contending views that both the African Charter and Section
6(6)(c) of the Constitution are justiciable and enforceable in Nigeria.50
48. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act (2004)
Cap. (A9), LFN.
49. Eghosa Ekhator, Improving Access to Environmental Justice Under the African Charter:
The Roles of NGOs in Nigeria, 22 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 63 (2014).
50. See id.
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III. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF OWNERSHIP OF OIL IN
NIGERIA
This section dwells on the evolution of the ownership regime in the oil
and gas sector of Nigeria. This section will attempt a further elucidation
of the legislative enactments in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria. Also, a
brief analysis of the evolution of the various derivative or revenue alloca-
tion formulae in the Nigeria will be in focus.
Nigeria is a federal state with three tiers of government: federal, state and
local. Nigeria’s variant of federalism has been subject of numerous criti-
ques and the subsisting view is that, the system is skewed to the advan-
tage of the central or federal government.51 Some of the laws
accentuating the federal or central government’s total control and owner-
ship of mineral resources include the Constitution of Nigeria 1999, the
Land Use Act, Petroleum Act, the Territorial Act, and the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone Act, amongst others. The rigidity and totality of the federal
government’s ownership of oil resources (to the detriment of indigenous
oil communities) has been one of the major reasons for the Niger Delta
crisis.52
The Constitution also vests ownership in the federal government. Section
44(3) of the Constitution vests in the federal government, exclusive con-
trol and management of minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in Nigeria.
The section states thus:
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the en-
tire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and nat-
ural gas in under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or
upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of
Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall
be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the Na-
tional Assembly.53
51. Itse Sagay, Nigeria: The Unfinished Federal Project, Paper presented at the Eighth Justice
Idigbe Memorial Lecture at the University of Benin Nigeria (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.nigeri-
anlawguru.com/articles/constitutional%20law/NIGERIA%20THE%20UNFINISHED%20FEDER
AL%20PROJECT.pdf; Wumi Iledare & Rotimi Suberu, Oil and Gas Resources in the Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, Framework paper prepared for delivery at the Conference on Oil and Gas in
Federal Systems (Mar. 3-4, 2010),  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOGMC/Resources/3369
29-1266445624608/Framework_Paper_Nigeria2.pdf.
52. Rhuks Ako, Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An Anti-Thesis to Environmental Justice, 53 J. AFR.
L. 289 (2009).
53. Constitution of Nigeria (1999), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/Constitutio-
nOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm.
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This constitutional provision is replicated in several legislation, including
the Exclusive Economic Zone Act,54 the Minerals and Mining Act55 and
the Land Use Act,56 amongst others. Ako posits that due to the unique
impacts of the Land Use Act (LUA) on the inhabitants of the Niger Delta
(especially in expropriation of land by the government), the LUA was the
final jigsaw that confirmed the totality of the federal government’s own-
ership of mineral resources in Nigeria.57 On the other hand, Ayodele-
Akaakar contends that with the enactment of the Offshore Oil Revenue
Decree in 1971, the totality of the federal government’s ownership and
control of mineral resources in Nigeria was confirmed.58 Herein, the Off-
shore and Oil Decree Act abrogated the ownership rights of the states
over mineral resources in their extant continental shelves, title to territo-
rial waters and revenue (rents) accruing from the petroleum or oil and
gas operations in such states.59 By virtue of this law, ownership and con-
trol of mineral resources were now vested in the federal government.
However, the LUA is attached to the Constitution by virtue of Section
315(1)(5)(d) and it can only be amended via constitutional amendment
procedures, which are cumbersome.60
Furthermore, under the Constitution, the federal government’s list or
schedule of exclusive powers contains all matters relating to the regula-
tion and management of the oil and gas industry.61 These matters include
export duties, mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, geo-
graphical surveys and natural gas), incorporation and regulation of cor-
porate bodies and taxation of profits, capital gains and incomes.62
Arguably, these provisions of the Constitution have been used by the
federal government to milk the Niger Delta of its wealth. Access to oil
revenue by states and communities in Nigeria has been one of the trig-
gers of conflicts in the Niger Delta.
54. Exclusive Economic Zone Act (2004) Cap. (E11), § 2 (Nigeria).
55. Minerals and Mining Act (2007), § 1 (Nigeria).
56. Land Use Act §§ 1, 28.
57. Ako, Nigeria’s Land Use Act, supra note 52, at 296-7.
58. Ayodele-Akaakar, supra note 46, at 7-8.
59. Id.
60. To buttress this assertion that the Land Use Act is difficult to amend, the Deputy Senate
President of the Nigerian Senate, who is also the Chairman on the Review of the 1999 Constitution,
averred that it was impossible to amend the LUA and that the amendment process failed to scale
through the Third Reading during the Senate amendment process of the Constitution. See Omololu
Ogunmade, Ekweremadu Advocates Removal of the Land Use Act, THIS DAY, Feb. 9, 2014, http://
www.thisdaylive.com/articles/ekweremadu-advocates-removal-of-land-use-act/170938/; see gener-
ally Nat Ofo, Amending the Nigerian Constitution, 4 AFR. J. LEGAL STUDIES 123-48 (2010) (discuss-
ing the difficulties in amending the Nigerian Constitution).
61. Iledare & Suberu, supra note 51.
62. Id.
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The next section undertakes an analysis of the various laws that accentu-
ate the federal government’s hold on oil revenues in Nigeria.
IV. LAWS ON OIL REVENUE ALLOCATION
In Nigeria, the allocation or distribution of federal revenue amongst the
various states is done under a constitutionally recommended formula. By
virtue of Section 162(1) of the Constitution, the Nigerian government
shall maintain a special account to be called ‘the federation account.’ All
the revenues collected by the federal government shall be paid into the
federation account. Proceeds from the oil and gas sector in Nigeria con-
tribute significantly to the revenue collected by the federal government.
Furthermore, different factors are taken into consideration when allocat-
ing revenue amongst the various states in Nigeria. Under Section 162(2)
of the Constitution, these factors include population of the states, internal
revenue, land mass, population density, internally generated revenue or
income, equality of the states and land mass. Thus, the Constitution pro-
vides for the formula for the distribution of oil revenues in Nigeria. This
is known as the ‘derivation principle.’63 Derivation, in the Nigerian con-
text, can be described as follows:
Derivation is a factor of fiscal federalism which ensures that
each unit of government contributes to the national coffers and
receives equitably in return through revenue allocation. Deriva-
tion can be described as compensation for the loss in revenue or
other economic activities through utilization of the land of any
unit of governments (or communities) for national resource
generation.64
Also, derivation refers to the arrangements for payments in rent in lieu of
the use and exploitation of mineral resources in a land.65 However, the
allocation of revenue (especially oil revenue) has been a source of politi-
cal and economic discord in Nigeria. The Niger Delta states (the oil pro-
ducing states) have contended that with the advent of the derivation
principle in Nigeria, the region is worse off.66
63. Amos Utuama, The Niger Delta Crisis, in FRESH DIMENSIONS ON THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS
OF NIGERIA  (Victor Ojakorotu ed., JAPSS Press 2009).
64. Ako, Resource Control, supra note 43, at 3.
65. Id. (citing Report of the Constitutional Conference Debates vol. III (1994-1995)).
66. Sagay, Ownership and Control, supra note 45; David Dafinone, Resource Control: The
Economic and Political Dimension, (2001), http://www.dawodu.com/dafin2.htm.
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The derivation principle has undergone various changes from the 50%
provided for by the both the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions, to be allocated
to the regions. While the military excursion was in power in Nigeria, it
was at its lowest at 1.0%.67 This was amended to 1.5% by the civilian
administration of Shehu Shagari in 1982 and subsequently, to 3% by
General Babangida’s regime in 1992.68 The derivation fund was in-
creased to at least 13% during the civilian administration of Olusegun
Obasanjo by virtue of Section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution. Due to its
ownership and control of mineral resources in Nigeria, the federal gov-
ernment collects the bulk of oil revenue accruing to Nigeria to the detri-
ment of the states, especially Niger Delta states.
It is evident that there is a correlation between the reduced oil revenue
accruing to the Niger Delta and the various laws that accentuate the fed-
eral government ownership of mineral resources. During the 1960s,
when regions (as states were known in Nigeria during this era), con-
trolled and owned the mineral resources within their territories, they had
access to 50% of oil revenues or rents from their regions. However, when
laws (such as the Petroleum Act amongst others) were promulgated
which provided for the federal government ownership of oil resources,
this had a negative impact on oil revenues accruing to oil producing
states in Nigeria. Thus, a substantial percentage of the oil revenue in
Nigeria accrues to the federal government to the detriment of the oil pro-
ducing states. This was the contention in Attorney General of the Federa-
tion v. Attorney General of Abia State,69 where the Nigerian Supreme
Court affirmed the position of the federal government of Nigeria being
owners of oil and mineral resources in Nigeria by virtue of Section
162(2) of the 1999 Constitution. This suit was a dispute between the
federal government and the eight littoral states in Nigeria (Akwa Ibom,
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Ogun, Lagos, Rivers and Ondo) on the cor-
rect seaward boundary of the aforementioned states.70 The Supreme
Court held that the seaward boundary for the purposes of computing the
amount of revenue due to the Federation Account accruing from the in-
67. Utuama, supra note 62. For the historical evolution of the derivation principle see I.R.
Elvis-Imo, Vindicating Property Rights of Peoples in the Niger Delta Through Interventionist Agen-
cies, in LAW AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: CURRENT CHALLENGES (Festus Emiri &
Gowon Deinduomo eds., Malthouse Press 2009). See also Ekanade Olumide, Minorities and Re-
source Allocation in a Transitional State: The Nigerian Experience, in HORROR IN PARADISE:
FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE CRISES OF THE NIGER DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA (Lamon-
ica, C & Omotola, J.S eds., Carolina Academic Press 2014).
68. Elvis-Imo, supra note 67.
69. Att’y Gen. Fed’n v. Att’y Gen. Abia State [2006] 6 NWLR (Pt. 764) 542–905 (Nigeria).
70. Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra note 16. For a detailed review of the case, see LAWRENCE
ATSEGBUA, OIL AND GAS LAW IN NIGERIA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 11-21 (Ababa Press 3d ed. 2012).
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come generated by mineral or natural resources from any state (littoral),
in accordance with Section 162(2) of the Nigerian Constitution, is the
low-mark of the surface or the inland waterways.71 Also, the judgement
of the Supreme Court confirmed the position of the federal government
as being over-lords of mineral resources throughout Nigeria and that
states have no claim to ownership over offshore mineral or natural re-
sources.72 The judgement also confirmed the position of the Nigerian
Constitution that states are entitled to a certain percentage of the revenue
derivable from such states to the Nigerian nation. The revenue accruing
to mineral producing states is at least 13% by virtue of Section 162(2) of
the Nigerian Constitution of 1999. In Nigeria, the federal government
exercises full control over mineral or natural resources, while the other
strands of government (local and state) are passive participants.
This has been one of the major reasons for the Niger Delta crisis because
the oil producing communities have been divested of their ownership of
oil found in their environment. The control of oil revenues, which is
based on the (federal government) ownership paradigm of the oil and gas
resources in Nigeria, deprives the host-communities from having a fair or
equitable share of the resources.73 On the other hand, it can be contended
that the accrued revenue (derivation) is a kind of compensation to the oil
producing states in the Niger Delta for the externalities of producing the
oil (for example, in terms of pollution and other negative consequences
accruing from the activities of oil MNCs).
In the recently concluded National Conference, which closed in August
2014, there was massive disagreement among the delegates (especially
on the basis of ethnicity and geographical backgrounds) on resource con-
trol and increases in derivation funds due to the Niger Delta states.74 The
Conference delegates agreed on a set of compromises and one of its rec-
ommendations in respect of the derivation principle was the following:
The Conference noted that assigning percentages for the in-
crease in derivation principle require some technical details and
71. Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra note 16.
72. Id.
73. Rhuks Ako, Substantive Injustice: Oil-Related Regulations and Environmental Injustice in
Nigeria, Paper Prepared for the Joint Workshop Organized by the IUCN Academy of Environmental
Law, Environmental Law Centre and Commission on Environmental Law, entitled: Linking Human
Rights and the Environment: A Comparative Review (Sept. 2010), https://community.iucn.org/rba1/
resources/Documents/Rhuks%20Temitope.pdf.
74. National Conference: Delegates Debate Report of ‘Resource Control’ Committee, PRE-
MIUM TIMES (July 8, 2014), https://www.premiumtimesng.com/national-conference/national-confer-
ence-delegates-debate-report-resource-control-committee/.
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considerations and therefore recommends that Government
should set up a Technical Committee to determine the appropri-
ate percentage on the issue and advise government
accordingly.75
The view of this article is that the revenue due to the oil producing states
accruing from the derivation principle should be increased to about 50%
to aid the development of the Niger Delta region.
In the following section, laws that accentuate the federal ownership of
mineral or oil resources will be analyzed.
V. LAWS REGULATING THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN
NIGERIA
This section of the article will examine legislative enactments directly
regulating the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The first law in focus will
be the Petroleum Act of 1969,76 which is the first post-colonial law on
the oil and gas sector. It defines ‘petroleum’ in Section 14 as “mineral oil
(or any related hydrocarbon) or natural gas as it exists in its natural state
in bituminous shales or other stratified deposits from which oil can be
extracted by destructive distillation.” Also, Section 14 defines “natural
gas” as gas obtained from boreholes and wells and consisting of hydro-
carbons. It has been contended that the aforementioned definition does
not distinguish between associated and non-associated gas.77 Associated
gas is the natural gas that emerges from oil wells (during the production
process) and it is usually a mixture of methane and other hydrocarbons,
such as ethane, butanes and pentanes, amongst others.78 On the other
hand, non-associated gas can be defined “as the natural gas which is in
reservoirs that do not contain significant quantities of crude oil, where
the volume of oil is small and where production of such gas does not
75. Draft Report of the National Conference, 595 (2014), https://media.premiumtimesng.com/
national-conference/wp-content/uploads/National-Conference-2014-Report-August-2014-Table-of-
Contents-Chapters-1-7.pdf.
76. Now Petroleum Act (2004) Cap. (P10), LFN.
77. Muhammed Ladan, Access to Environmental Justice in Oil Pollution and Gas Flaring
Cases as Human Right Issue in Nigeria, Paper Presented at A Training Workshop for Federal Minis-
try of Justice Lawyers Organized by the Institute for Oil and Gas Law in Abuja Nigeria 34 (Nov. 28-
30, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336093.
78. Birnur Buzcu-Guven et al., Gas Flaring and Venting: Extent, Impacts and Remedies, Paper
Prepared by the Energy Forum of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy as Part of the
Study: Energy Market Consequences of an Emerging U.S. Carbon Management Policy, http://baker-
institute.org/files/439/.
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significantly affect recovery of the crude oil.”79 Gas flares, especially
those resulting from associated gas, are highly prevalent in the oil and
gas sector of Nigeria and this theme is explored in the section on gas
flaring in this article.
By virtue of Section 1(1) of the Act, the “entire ownership and control of
all petroleum in, under or upon any land in Nigeria is vested in the state,”
that is, the federal government of Nigeria. By virtue of Section 1(2) of
the Act, this provision is deemed to apply to all land (including land
covered by water) which is in Nigeria, under the Nigerian territorial wa-
ters, forms part of the continental shelf or forms part of the Exclusive
Economic Zone of Nigeria. Furthermore, by virtue of Section 2(1) of the
Act, only Nigerian citizens or companies incorporated in Nigeria can val-
idly partake in the oil and gas industry. Such participatory activities in-
clude oil exploration, drilling, production, storage, refining and
transportation.80 Under Section 2 of the Act, companies can be granted
various rights including oil exploration licences to explore for petroleum,
a prospecting licence and an oil mining lease.
The Office of the Minster of Petroleum Resources in Nigeria is an impor-
tant entity in the regulation of oil and gas industry by virtue of the Petro-
leum Act. The major feature of the Act is the mode of control exercised
over the sector by the Minister of Petroleum Resources.81 Some of the
powers of the Minister include the power to grant and revoke licenses
and make regulations, amongst others. This section will focus on the
powers of the Minister to revoke licenses. Arguably, these powers of the
Minister have been subject to abuse and, as will be highlighted in this
section, have been subject of litigation in a plethora of cases.
The Petroleum Act contains procedures for the revocation of oil pros-
pecting licenses (or oil mining licenses) by the Minister. Paragraph
23(1)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Petroleum Act states that the Minister may
revoke any oil prospecting or mining licence where the licensee or lessee
(oil companies) becomes controlled ultimately or indirectly by a non-
Nigerian or foreigner. Also, by virtue of Paragraph 24 of the Act, the
Minister of Petroleum Resources can revoke oil licences for the follow-
ing reasons if, in his opinion, the licensee or lessee (oil firms) are not
conducting their operations or activities continuously, or not conducting
their operations in business-like manner in accordance with requirements
79. Definition, Oil and Gas Division of IQPC, http://www.oilandgasiq.com/glossary/non-asso-
ciated-gas/.
80. Iledare & Suberu, supra note 51.
81. Ayodele-Akaakar, supra note 46, at 1.
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approved for the lessee and not conducting their activities in accordance
with good oil field practices. Also, oil licences can be revoked by the
Minister by virtue of this paragraph if the oil firms (licensees and les-
sees) fail to adhere to the provisions of the Petroleum Act and other al-
lied regulations or laws. Furthermore, oil prospecting or oil mining
licences can also be revoked by the Minister if oil companies fail to pay
their rent or royalties within the specified period and if they fail to sub-
mit reports on its operations or activities as the Minister may require of
them.
The powers of revocation of oil licences vested in the Minister are pro-
vided in paragraphs 25-26 of Schedule 1 of the Petroleum Act. Paragraph
25 states that the Minister shall inform the licensee or lessee of the
grounds on which the revocation is made or contemplated and shall in-
vite the lessee or licensee to make any explanation if he so desires. Para-
graph 26 posits that if the Minister is satisfied with the explanation given
(by the licensee and lessee), he may invite the firms to rectify the matter
complained of within a specified period of time. By virtue of paragraph
27, if the licensee or lessee provides insufficient explanation or does not
rectify the matter complained of within a stipulated period, the Minister
may revoke the license or lease. Furthermore, a notice sent to the last
known address of the licensee or lessee or his legal representative in
Nigeria and published in the federal gazette shall be sufficient notice to
the licensee or lessee of the revocation of the license or lease (paragraph
28). Additionally, by virtue of paragraph 29, the revocation shall be with-
out prejudice to any liabilities which the licensee or lessee may have
incurred or any claim against them which may have accrued to the Niger-
ian government.
Kolo avers that the revocation procedure, as enunciated in the Petroleum
Act, “encapsulates in a nutshell the principle of ‘due process’ and the
concept of ‘natural justice’ as enshrined in the 1999 Nigerian Constitu-
tion.”82 Section 44(1) of the Constitution states that no moveable prop-
erty or interest in an immovable property shall be compulsorily acquired
except in the manner prescribed by law. Also, Section 36 of the Constitu-
tion provides for the right to fair hearing in determination of a person’s
civil rights and obligations in any matter for or against government or
authority and such a person is entitled to fair hearing within a reasonable
time by the courts (or any other tribunal).
82. A. Kolo, Legal Issues Arising From the Termination of Oil Prospecting Licences by the
Nigerian Government, 19 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 164, 172 (2001).
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Oil prospecting or oil mining licenses can be classified as ‘property’ by
virtue of Section 44(1) of the Constitution. Thus, licenses confer on the
licensees or lessees, economic and commercial value or rights.83 The
Minister of Petroleum cannot unilaterally revoke or change the terms of
such licenses.84 Any breach or unilateral revocation of an oil prospecting
or oil mining license can be argued to be a breach of contract and against
the tenor of Section 44 of the Constitution.85 A licensee can approach the
courts to get redress if the procedure (on revocation of oil licensees) en-
shrined in the Petroleum Act is jettisoned and such revocation may be
held to be void, invalid or unconstitutional by courts. Under the adminis-
tration of late President Yar’adua, the oil prospecting licence of the Ko-
rean National Oil Company (KNOC) was revoked in January 2009. In
August 2009, the Federal High Court sitting in Abuja declared President
Yar’Adua’s action to be illegal and unconstitutional.86 The Court held
that KNOC complied with the terms of the agreement and the Minister of
State had no constitutional power to revoke the licence. It further held
that the President, acting through the Minister of State for Petroleum, has
acted beyond his powers (ultra vires) in the agreement. The Court held
that the President had no authority to revoke the oil prospecting licenses
because the Minister of Petroleum is the legal custodian in the revocation
of oil leases in Nigeria. The Court also held that notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 5(1) of the Constitution, which grants the President
the power to revoke the licence by virtue of the Petroleum Act, only the
Minister of Petroleum (and not a Minister of State) can validly revoke an
oil prospecting licence.87 The Court dismissed the preliminary objection
of the defendants by stating that the power of revocation of oil licences
by the Minister must adhere to the principles of fair hearing as enshrined
in the Constitution.
Recently in 2012, the Supreme Court in NNPC & Attorney General of
the Federation v. FAMFA Oil Ltd.88 held that the Nigerian government
must adhere to the process enshrined in the Petroleum Act and the Con-
stitution when exercising its right to participate in any oil block or well
in the oil and gas industry. The Court set aside the acquisition of a 50%
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also NNPC & Att’y Gen. Fed’n v. FAMFA Oil Ltd., [2012] 17 NWLR 148
(Nigeria).
85. Kolo, supra note 82.
86. Court Voids Yar’Adua’s Revocation of Korean Oil Prospecting Licence, VANGUARD (Aug.
2009), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/court-voids-yaraduas-revocation-of-korean-oil-deal/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2014) (discussing the details of the unreported case).
87. Id.
88. NNPC v. FAMFA, supra note 84.
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stake by the Nigerian government in the Oil Mining Licence (OML)
originally ceded or granted to FAMFA. The basis for the Court’s deci-
sion was that the acquisition contravened paragraph 35 of the 1st Sched-
ule of the Petroleum Act and Section 44(1) of the constitution.89
Discretionary powers of public officers can be controlled by various
mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms include subjecting such deci-
sions to public enquiry or scrutiny through publication of guidelines and
approval of such guidelines by an independent body, amongst others.90
Also, discretionary powers (or delegated legislation) exercised by public
officers are subject to the tenets of administrative law.91 The decisions of
public officers are subject to administrative fairness and may be held to
be void by courts if the appropriate procedures are not followed.92 Deci-
sions of public officers are subject to judicial review and judicial review
in Nigeria is by virtue of Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution, which
states that “any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this
Chapter has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in any State in
relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress.” In
Abdulkarim v. Incar Nigeria Ltd.,93 the court held that judicial review
gave the opportunity to courts in Nigeria to review administrative deci-
sions with regards to their constitutionality, legality, rationality and regu-
larity. In judicial review cases, the courts may grant remedies. These
remedies may include an order of mandamus, order of injunction, decla-
ration of rights, and the award of damages, amongst others,94 against the
public officers.
With regards to the Petroleum Act and its ancillary regulations, it is
contended that the language used in the various regulations “permits
regulatory discretion”95 by the Minister. However, in exercising the dis-
cretionary powers, the Minister could be influenced by different consid-
erations. These considerations may include bribery, the Minister’s desire
to placate or castigate local communities or accommodate the interests of
89. T. Soniyi, Supreme Court Voids FG’s Acquisition of OML 127, THIS DAY (May 13, 2012),
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/supreme-court-voids-fg-s-acquisition-of-oml-127/115697/.
90. EVARISTUS OSHIONEBO, REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: AN AFRICAN CASE STUDY 53 (Univ. of Toronto Press 2009). Also under
Nigerian law, recourse can be made to administrative bodies for redress in such situations. The
Public Complaints Commission [hereinafter PCC] is one of such administrative bodies wherein judi-
cial review of administrative actions lies. For an analysis of the PCC, see International Commission
of Jurists, supra note 37.
91. See International Commission of Jurists, supra note 37, at 36-37.
92. Id.
93. Abdulkarim v. Incar Nig. Ltd., [1992] 7 NWLR (Pt. 251) 1 (Nigeria).
94. International Commission of Jurists, supra note 37, at 39.
95. OSHIONEBO, REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 90, at 52.
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businesses.96 Recently, licences have been revoked on the basis of politi-
cal patronage in the oil and gas sector of Nigeria. For example, a promi-
nent politician and businessman in Nigeria, who owned an indigenous oil
company, had his company’s oil license revoked allegedly because of his
political differences with a former president.97
Furthermore, a major weakness in the allocation of oil licences in Nigeria
is the susceptibility of the process to corrupt practices. This is mainly due
to the fact that the allocation process is not well regulated and the ab-
sence of consultation.98 The lack of consultation was highly pronounced
during the military era in Nigeria. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo
set out to make the allocation of oil licences and blocks more competitive
and transparent by allowing the government to advertise the available
blocks, the selection standards and the number of different bids re-
ceived.99 However, the bidding process was fraught with many short-
comings, including that the selection criteria were disregarded, some
companies were forced into partnerships and a few companies were
favoured ahead of the others.100 Due to the shortcomings of the bidding
process, probe panels were instituted to investigate the allocation of oil
blocks procedures. Some of the findings of the panels included manipu-
lation of the process, which resulted in the revocation of some oil blocks
and the suspension of the Director of Petroleum Resources (DPR) in
2008.101
Section 9 of the Petroleum Act grants the Minister the power to make
subsidiary regulations and some regulations have been made in pursuant
to the provisions of the Act. Some of the subsidiary regulations include
the Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations, Petroleum Regulations, Petroleum
(Drilling and Production Regulation) Regulations 1969, Petroleum Re-
finery Regulations 1974, Crude Oil (Transportation and Shipment) Regu-
lations, Deep Water Block Allocations to Companies (Back in Rights)
Regulations and Oil Prospecting Licenses (Conversion to Oil Mining
Leases etc.) Regulations, amongst others. Some of these regulations will
be analyzed in the next part of this paper. The regulations constitute a
significant part of the legal framework in the oil and gas industry.
96. Id.
97. For the facts of the court case, see C. Amanze-Nwachukwu, Danjuma Wants Court to
Reverse Sale of Oil Block, THIS DAY (Oct. 12, 2006), http://www.legaloil.com/NewsItem.asp?Docu
mentIDX=1160950540&Category=news.
98. A. Gillies, Reforming Corruption Risks Out of Nigerian Oil. (Part One), (2009) http://www
.cmi.no/publications/file/3295-reforming-corruption-out-of-nigerian-oil-part-one.pdf.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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The analysis in the next section will bring to the fore the reasons for the
ineffectual regulatory framework in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria.
A. PETROLEUM REGULATIONS IN THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR IN
NIGERIA
The first regulation in focus will be the Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations
created by the Petroleum Minister as provided in Section 9 of the Petro-
leum Act. This Regulation defines ‘good oil field practice’, the standard
required of oil companies operating in Nigeria by the Petroleum Act.102
While this phrase ‘good oil field practice’ is not defined in the Petroleum
Act, Section 7 of the Nigerian Minerals Oil (Safety) Regulations pro-
vides insight regarding its meaning thus:
Where no specific provision is made by these Regulations in
respect thereof, all drilling, production and other operations
necessary for production and subsequent handling of the crude
oil and natural gas shall conform with good oil field practice,
which for the purpose of these regulations shall be considered to
be adequately covered by the appropriate current Institute of Pe-
troleum Safety Codes, the American Petroleum Institute’s
Codes or the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Codes.103
The prevailing industry standards in the United Kingdom and the United
States are deemed to be the standards that oil MNCs should adhere to in
Nigeria. Furthermore, there is generally poor enforcement and imple-
mentation of oil and gas regulations in Nigeria. Also, some statutes make
provisions for lower standards to be operational in the oil industry. Such
laws or regulations include the Federal Environmental Protection Agency
(FEPA Act), which has been repealed,104 the Department of Petroleum
Resources (DPR) Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petro-
leum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) 2001.105 These regulations recom-
mend standards that are lower than the oil industry standards envisaged
by the Nigerian Minerals Oil (Safety) Regulations.106 The oil MNCs ad-
102. Petroleum Act Cap. (P10), cited in Engobo Emeseh et al., Corporations, CSR and Self-
Regulation: What Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis? 11 GERMAN L. J. 234 (2010).
103. Nigerian Minerals Oil (Safety) Regulations § 7, cited in id. at 245.
104. FEPA has been replaced by the National Environmental Standards and Regulation Enforce-
ment Agency [hereinafter NESREA].
105. E.g., Emeseh, supra note 102.
106. Id.
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here to the former regulations rather than the standard envisaged by the
regulations made under the Petroleum Act. The major reason is that
MNCs are trying to avoid the more rigorous standards inherent in Niger-
ian Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations. Thus, this anomaly is a reflection
of the parlous regulatory regime in Nigeria where the powerful MNCs
choose the laws which they adhere to.
In the oil and gas sector, there is a close relationship between the govern-
ment and major oil MNCs.107 For example, the erstwhile Minister of
Petroleum is a former ‘External Executive Director’ of Shell (Nige-
ria).108 Arguably, the relationship between the oil MNCs and the Niger-
ian government shows that oil MNCs have effectively captured the
regulatory and governance regime in the oil and gas sector. Furthermore,
in the oil and gas industry, corruption is endemic and both the oil MNCs
and government officials are involved in corrupt practices. For example,
the illegal bunkering or criminal theft of crude oil trade in the Niger
Delta is said to be committed by some local youths or community lead-
ers, members of the Nigerian military, politicians, some high ranking
officials of the NNPC and retired military officers.109 Also, some oil
MNCs engage in bribery and corruption to facilitate their stake in the
lucrative oil contracts in the oil and gas sector of Nigeria.110
One plausible explanation for the lax regulatory regime in the oil and gas
sector is the relationship between the government as both a regulator and
player in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The NNPC is a major player
in the oil industry and involved in joint venture agreements with oil
MNCs. In joint venture agreements in the oil industry, NNPC is always
the majority shareholder. A government as a partner in a business that it
regulates is not an uncommon phenomenon. However, unless “robust,
independent regulatory and oversight mechanisms are in place, conflicts
107. J.G. Frynas, Corporate and State Responses to Anti-Oil Protests in the Niger Delta, 100
AFR. AFFAIRS 27, 52 (2001).
108. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-06-51/ex-
ecutive-branch/104-federal-ministry-of-petroleum-resources/184-ministry-of-petroleum-resources
(last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
109. J.B. Asuni, Blood Oil in the Niger Delta, United States Institute of Peace Special Report
(2009), http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/26155/1/Blood%20Oil%20in%20the
%20Niger%20Delta.pdf?1.
110. For example, Shell has admitted engaging in the systematic corruption and bribery of
Nigerian oil officials. See Shell Bribes Among Culture of Corruption, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-05/shell-bribes-among-culture-of-corruption-panalpina-
admits.html.
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of interest can result in violations of human rights.”111 The latter scenario
exemplifies the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The Department of Petro-
leum Resources (DPR) is an agency of the government that regulates and
enforces policies and regulations in the oil and gas industry. It has been
argued that considering the economic interest of the Nigerian state
through its agency (NNPC) in the oil industry, it will be very unlikely for
the DPR to effectively implement or enforce the oil and gas related regu-
lations.112 The DPR is not an independent body and it appears to be an
extension of the state. Arguably, the relationship between the DPR and
the oil MNCs appears to be one of partnership, which is a negation of the
notion that an independent body should regulate the oil and gas indus-
try.113 The World Bank is against the idea that of government as a regu-
lator and partner in the oil and gas industry and argues that “this situation
has resulted in the government regulating oil pollution while at the same
time being party to much of the oil-related environmental problems of
the Niger Delta.”114
The next set of regulations in focus will be the Petroleum (Drilling and
Production) Regulations 1969 and the Petroleum Refining Regulations
1974. These subsidiary regulations were made by the Minister by virtue
of the powers conferred on him by Section 9 of the Petroleum Act. Regu-
lation 25 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969
(PDPR) enjoins oil licensees or lessees (these are mainly oil multination-
als in Nigeria) to:
adopt all practicable precautions including the provision of up-
to-date equipment  approved by  the Director of Petroleum Re-
sources, to prevent the pollution of inland waters, rivers, water
courses, the territorial waters of Nigeria or the high seas by oil,
mud or other fluids or substances which might contaminate the
water, banks or shoreline or which might cause harm or destruc-
tion to fresh water or marine life and where any such pollution
occurs or has occurred, shall take prompt steps to control and if
possible, end it.115
111. Amnesty Int’l, Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta, 42 (2009),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/017/2009/en/e2415061-da5c-44f8-a73c-a7a4766ee
21d/afr440172009en.pdf.
112. International Commission of Jurists, supra note 37, at 39.
113. Id.
114. Industry and Energy Operations Division West Central Africa Department, World Bank
Defining an Environmental Development Strategy for the Niger Delta, Vol II  45 (May 25, 1995),
cited in Amnesty Int’l, supra note 111, at 42.
115. Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969, Legal Notice 69 of 1969, Regula-
tion 25, cited in OSHIONEBO, REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 90, at 51.
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Furthermore, Regulation 36 of the PDPR enjoins oil companies (licen-
sees or lessees) to undertake their activities or “operations in a proper
and workmanlike manner” in accordance with “good oil field practices.”
Also, Section 36 of the PDPR advises oil companies to maintain and
keep their apparatus in good condition.116 Section 40 of the PDPR en-
joins the oil companies (licensees and lessees) to dispose of oil wastes
from storage vessels into proper receptacles constructed in accordance
with the law (Petroleum Act).117 Also, the waste collected must be dis-
posed of in the way and manner approved of by the Director of Petro-
leum Resources or as provided by any applicable law or regulations.118
Under PDPR, the oil MNCs have obligation to decommission their oil
facilities (when no longer being used) and restore the damaged land in
that area to as far possible to its pre-existing condition.119 Also by virtue
of Regulation 35 of the PDPR, abandonment of oil boreholes and wells
are prohibited except allowed in writing by the Director and derelict
wells and boreholes must be secured properly.
The next regulation in focus will be the Petroleum Refining Regulations
(PRR) 1974. Paragraph 43 (3) of the PRR provides thus:
The Manager [of a Refinery] shall adopt all practicable precau-
tions including the provision of up to-date equipment as may be
specified by the Director [of Petroleum Resources] from time to
time, to prevent the pollution of the environment by petroleum
or petroleum products; and where such pollution occurs the
manager shall take prompt steps to control and, if possible, end
it.
Also, under Regulation 45(1), a contravention of this regulation carries a
penalty of 100 (NGN) or imprisonment for a term of six months. Further-
more, various sanctions are prescribed by the Petroleum Act to promote
the enforcement of the aforementioned regulations. Sanctions include the
power of arrest without warrant, exercised by the Minister of Petroleum,
over any person suspected of committing any offence in contravention of
the act or its regulations by virtue of Section 8(d) of the Petroleum Act.
Also, such a person or individual is handed over to a police officer as
soon as practicable. However, the Petroleum Act does not state the pen-
116. Id.
117. EBEKU, supra note 46.
118. Id.
119. OSHIONEBO, REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 90.
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alty that may be suffered by such an individual if convicted.120 Also,
Paragraph 24(1)(d) of the First Schedule and Section 2(3) of the Petro-
leum Act provides that the Minister can revoke any license or lease (of
the companies) if they are not conducting their operations with ‘good oil
field practice.’ This provision is not enforced due to a number of reasons
and the penalty is rarely activated. The underlying reason for this is the
economic importance of oil in the Nigerian economy and the importance
of oil multinational corporations to the Nigerian economy.121
The regulations have been criticized by a number of Nigerian academ-
ics122 on the basis of the imprecision of the wordings in the regulations.
For example, in the PDPR, terms such as ‘good oil field practice,’ ‘all
practicable precautions’ and ‘prompt steps,’ amongst others, are not de-
fined, thus making such terms vague and ambiguous.123 For example, it
has been argued that the ‘good oil field practice’ expected of oil compa-
nies “might mean minimizing economic cost of production without re-
gard to safety or environmental care.”124 Notwithstanding the safeguards
(such as oil activities to be conducted in a vigorous and business-like
manner, amongst others), the use of ill-defined terms in the Petroleum
Act and its ancillary regulations promotes the “maximization of produc-
tion rather than protection of the environment.”125 On the other hand,
Oshionebo argues that notwithstanding the criticisms of the regulations
by academics, it has the advantage of being flexible, thereby malleable or
adjustable to recent developments in the oil and gas industry in Nige-
ria.126 Arguably, an advantage is that ‘good oil field practice’ may lead
to technological developments, which increase safety and could then be
adopted without the need for legislative change. However, this will be
dependent on its enforcement.
One major criticism of the oil and gas regulatory regime is the personifi-
cation of the powers in the Petroleum Act and its incidental regulations
in an individual, the Minister of Petroleum Resources or in the President
of the country.127 Whilst there are various academic and political argu-
ments supporting the federal government’s ownership and control of oil
120. EBEKU, supra note 46.
121. Id.
122. A.O. Ekpu, Environmental Impact of Oil on Water: A Comparative Overview of the Law
and Policy in the United States and Nigeria, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 55-108 (1995).
123. OSHIONEBO, REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 90.
124. Ekpu, supra note 122, at 79.
125. Id.
126. OSHIONEBO, REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 90.
127. During President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration, there was no substantive Minister of
Petroleum. The President acted as the Minister of Petroleum.
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and gas resources in Nigeria, the consensus is that the federal govern-
ment’s “ownership and control of oil resources, has caused deep bitter-
ness, resentment and a sense of majority oppression of the minority
producers of oil.”128 Communities in the oil producing states feel ex-
ploited and cheated by the regulatory regime wherein the oil wealth
(found in their lands) is taken without appropriate compensation, the Ni-
ger Delta environment is left in a state of pollution and other incidental
negative consequences of the oil industry.
As a panacea, the Petroleum Act and its incidental regulations (and other
laws evidencing the federal government’s exclusive ownership and con-
trol of oil and gas resources in Nigeria) should be amended to promote
active participation by indigenes of the oil producing states in the man-
agement of oil and gas resources.
The next section considers the statutory compensatory regime in the oil
and gas industry. Payment of adequate compensation to victims of the
activities of oil MNCs in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria has been at
the centre of many conflicts in the Niger Delta. This section will under-
take a critical analysis of the compensatory regime and proffer alterna-
tives to improve its legal framework.
B. STATUTORY COMPENSATION IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN
NIGERIA
Generally, in Nigeria, once an oil MNC has been given a permit or oil
license (lease) by the appropriate authorities, it behoves on the state gov-
ernment to grant access to the land for oil and gas purposes to the
MNC.129 Any inhabitant or user of that land will be obligated to relocate
because such land is being used for ‘overriding public purposes’ (in the
oil and gas sector). The question at this juncture is: are the land users
entitled to compensation for their loss of land and other incidental losses
accruing from such expropriation under the law in Nigeria? There are
various statutes regulating compensation occasioned by the activities of
oil MNCs in the oil and gas industry. The laws include the Land Use Act
(LUA),130 the Oil Pipelines Act,131 Minerals and Mining Act132 and the
Petroleum Act133 with its incidental regulations. The first statute in focus
128. Ayodele-Akaarkar, supra note 46, at 9.
129. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 110.  For the various types of leases in the oil and gas industry,
see Atsegbua, supra note 71.
130. Land Use Act Cap. (202).
131. Oil Pipelines Act Cap. (07).
132. Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act (2007).
133. Petroleum Act Cap. (P10).
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will be the LUA 1978.134 In analyzing the laws on compensation, other
statutes will be analyzed and contrasted with the LUA where necessary
for further elucidation. Section 1 of the LUA vests the ownership of all
land in the state. Section 1 of the LUA states thus:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, all land comprised in the
territory of each state in the Federation are vested in the Gover-
nor of that State and such land shall be held in trust and admin-
istered for the use and common benefit of Nigerians in
accordance with provisions of  this Act.
Section 28 of the Act permits the compulsory acquisition of land for oil
and mining exploration. The governor of a state is permitted under Sec-
tion 28(1) to revoke a right of occupancy for overriding public interest.
‘Overriding public interest,’ under Section 28(1)(b) of the Act, is the
requirement of land by the government and, under Section 28(2)(c), it is
“the requirement of the land for mining purposes or oil purposes or for
any purpose connected forthwith.” The LUA alienated people from their
communal or traditional lands.135 It has been argued that the LUA
(which was originally a military enacted decree), due to its distinctive
impacts on the Niger Delta people, was promulgated to deprive the peo-
ple of active participation in the oil and gas sector of Nigeria.136 Prior to
the enactment of this Act, families and communities were “legally
recognised as land owners and therefore were to be consulted before oil
exploration could be initiated.”137 Also, the Act has affected compensa-
tory rights available to the people deprived of their lands.138
In the area of compensation, the LUA has been a militating factor in the
payment of adequate compensation claims. Section 29 (2) provides that:
If a right of occupancy is revoked for the cause set out in para-
graph (c) of subsection (2) of section 28 or in paragraph (b) of
subsection (3) of the same section the holder and the occupier
shall be entitled to compensation under the appropriate provi-
134. Land Use Act Cap. (202).
135. For a comprehensive review of the impacts of the LUA on indigenous land tenure system
in Nigeria see P.E. Oshio, The Indigenous Land Tenure and Nationalization of Land in Nigeria, 10
B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 43-62 (1990).
136. Ako, supra note 52.
137. R. Ako & P. Okonmah, Minority Rights Issues in Nigeria: A Theoretical Analysis of His-
torical and Contemporary Conflicts in the Oil-Rich Niger Delta Region, 16 INT’L J. MINORITY &
GROUP RTS. 53, 58 (2009).
138. Ako, supra note 52.
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sions of the Minerals Act or the Petroleum Act or any legisla-
tion replacing the same.
Under the Petroleum Act 1969, Paragraph 36 of the First Schedule of the
Petroleum Act states that:
The holder of an oil exploration licence, oil prospecting licence
or oil mining lease shall, in addition to any liability for compen-
sation to which he may be subject under any provision of this
Act, be liable to pay fair and adequate compensation for the
disturbance of surface or other rights to any person who owns or
is in lawful occupation of the licensed or leased lands.
Also, Section 77 of the Minerals and Mining Act provides for compensa-
tory sums (fair and reasonable) for damage done to the surface of the
land wherein oil prospecting or mining has been attempted and compen-
sates the owner for crops, trees, buildings or works damaged in the pro-
cess.139 Also, future earnings and loss of land occasioned by the
activities of firms on land is excluded from the compensatory regime by
virtue of the LUA.140 The LUA is said to have ousted the jurisdiction of
regular courts in litigation in oil-related and compensation cases by vir-
tue of Sections 28, 29 and 47(2) of the Act.141 The Land Use and Alloca-
tion Committee determines the quantum and adequacy of compensation
under the Act. Under Section 2 of the LUA, the functions of the Land
Use and Allocation Committee are discussed and include advising the
governor on matters connected with management of land, the resettle-
ment of people affected by the revocation of rights of occupancy on the
basis of overriding public interest and settling disputes as to the amount
of compensation payable under the Act for improvements on land.
However, the ousting of the jurisdiction of the courts by the LUA has
been made redundant by virtue of Section 44 of the Constitution. Under
Section 44, any property (movable or interest in immovable property)
compulsorily acquired in Nigeria requires prompt payment of compensa-
tion and any person claiming compensation has access to a court of law,
tribunal or body having jurisdiction in Nigeria in the determination of his
interest in the property and compensation to be paid.142 Thus, despite the
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Ako, Substantive Injustice, supra note 73.
142. Ako, supra note 52.
28
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 21 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol21/iss1/6
2016] THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA 71
provisions of the LUA ousting the jurisdiction of courts of law in the
land, compensation cases are considered “contrary to the constitution and
to the extent of its inconsistency, should be considered null and void.”143
However, these aforementioned laws do not provide adequate compensa-
tion for land users living in the Niger Delta. The criteria used to compute
or value the compensation claims to be paid by the oil MNCs include
computation based on the value on “surface goods lost.”144 Under Sec-
tion 20 of the Oil Pipelines Act, damage to surface goods (which is the
basis of computation) includes crops, buildings and profitable trees. The
value of the land is not taken into consideration by any of the aforemen-
tioned statutes when computing compensation claims in the oil and gas
sector of Nigeria. The mineral or natural resources found in or upon the
land “are viewed by the state as public goods and government’s interven-
tion in their exploitation becomes simply a case for public use.”145 This
is a major disincentive of the compensation regime in the oil and gas
sector. In Nigeria, especially in the Southern states (the Niger Delta is
located in Southern Nigeria), land is of cultural importance to the indige-
nous land users.146 These land users have sentimental or emotional at-
tachment to the land. This attachment stems from either the land having
been in the possession of the local community (or family) for centuries or
from their ancestors (progenitors) being buried under such lands.147 For
compensation cases, the oil-related legislation does not take into consid-
eration the emotional or sentimental attachment of land users when com-
puting the value of surface goods on the land.
A major anomaly in the compensation regime in Nigeria is the value or
worth of the compensation paid for by oil MNCs to land users in the oil
and gas industry. The underlying reason for this anomaly is that the gov-
ernment owns the land (and the mineral resources) by virtue of the LUA.
However, individuals in Nigeria do have rights of occupancy over their
lands, which is akin to ownership.148 Furthermore, scholars have con-
143. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (1999), § 1(3).
144. Amnesty International, supra note 111, at 24.
145. Akpan, supra note 44, at 5.
146. V.C. Uchendu, State, Land, and Society in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment of Land Use
Decree (1978), 6 J. AFR. STUDIES (1979).
147. Id.
148. For the definition of a right of occupancy, see Chilenye Nwapi, Land Ownership, Mineral
Development and Agriculture in Nigeria: An Examination of Key Issues and Challenges, in RHUKS
AKO & DAMILOLA OLAWUYI, FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL LAW: READINGS ON SUSTAINABLE AGRI-
CULTURE AND THE LAW IN NIGERIA 33 (Afe Babalola Press 2015) (“a right granted by the governor
to a person to hold and occupy a piece of land for a term of years upon a payment of specified rent
and fulfilment of other covenants and conditions. . .”). See also Land Use Act § 5(1).
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tended that a right of occupancy is “a mere lease, and it cannot be trans-
ferred or otherwise alienated without the consent of the governor.”149 As
highlighted above, a governor can revoke a right of occupancy on the
basis of ‘overriding public interest.’
Notwithstanding the provisions of the LUA, oil MNCs do pay some form
of payment to the land users of land wherein oil and gas activities are
located. However, the contention is the quantum of the payment or com-
pensation paid. The oil MNCs do strive to pay compensation on the basis
of the market value of the land.150 It is alleged that in the computation of
the amount to be paid as compensation to land users or oil pollution
victims in the Niger Delta, the land users or victims are not consulted in
the scientific evaluation to establish the value of the property in ques-
tion.151 For example, in the event of an oil spill, many communities and
oil MNCs may disagree on the cause of the spill.152 However, the version
of the cause asserted by the oil MNC is always held as the correct posi-
tion by the Nigerian authorities because there is no independent means of
verifying their assertions, thereby truncating many communities recourse
to compensatory payments.153 This action of the MNCs, in calculating
the damage to the property of the victim, is called ‘scientific evaluation.’
Thus, it is alleged that during a typical ‘scientific evaluation’ by the oil
MNC, the owner of the damaged property are not consulted to establish
the owner’s investment in his damaged property.154
Also, even when compensation is paid to the land users, the amounts are
very abysmal. Aghalino gives an example of this from the 1980s when
ELF (a major oil MNC in Nigeria) paid twenty eight thousand, four hun-
dred naira (28,400) for the acquisition of 1.4 hectares land at Obodogwu
village of Ndokwa East Local Government Area in the Niger Delta re-
gion.155 In today’s rate, twenty-eight thousand, four hundred naira is
about one hundred and seventy-six dollars.156 Oil MNCs justify such
149. Nwapi, supra note 148. See also Land Use Act §§ 21, 22.
150. Uchendu, supra note 146.
151. S.O. Aghalino, Issues and Trend in the Payment of Compensation in the Oil Industry in
Nigeria: 1969-1997, 12 IBOM J. HIST. & INT’L STUDIES 186-208 (2005).
152. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 111, at 71.
153. Id.
154. Aghalino, supra note 151.
155. Id.  Thus, “the value of money paid for land, acquisition for the construction of facilities
for oil operation had been generally low.” Aghalino, supra note 151, at 200. See also V.A. Akujuru
& L. Ruddock, The Determination of Compensation Payable in the Niger Delta for Compulsory
Acquisition and the Need for Sustainable Practice, 16 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. AFR. 102, 108-110
(2014).
156. Exchange Rate as of 30 September 2014, XE CURRENCY CONVERTER, http://www.xe.com/
ucc/convert/?Amount=28400&From=NGN&To=USD (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
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payments on the ground that most of the oil and gas activities occur in
the rural parts of the Niger Delta and such rural lands do not possess an
intrinsic economic or market value.157 The view of this article is that oil
MNCs (especially western based) consider lands in Nigeria as vestiges of
colonial or neo colonial acquisitions with little or no market value. Ar-
guably, there is a correlation between the value of land as evidenced in
its oil and gas resources and the astronomical profits accruing to oil
MNCs due to the oil and gas related activities in such lands. This has
been a ground for discontent amongst the people of the Niger Delta to-
wards the activities of oil MNCs in Nigeria. The relevant laws should be
amended so that oil MNCs can pay appropriate taxes on their astronomi-
cal revenues or profit to the local communities wherein the oil and gas
activities are located.
Recently, there have been slight increases in the quantum paid by the oil
MNCs to land users or victims of environmental disasters occasioned by
the activities in the oil and gas sector of Nigeria. Oil MNCs in Nigeria
pay higher rates of compensation than the officially sanctioned rates.158
In 1995, the recommended official rate was =N1375 per hectare.159 How-
ever, in 1997, the Oil Producers Trade Section (OPTS) of the Lagos
Chambers of Commerce (a conglomeration of oil and gas companies
who are members of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce) suggested com-
pensation rates of =N15,860 per hectare of land160 as payment for crops
(and other surface goods) damaged in such land. While OPTS compensa-
tion rates are higher, they are nonetheless still meagre and of limited
economic value to the land owner or user.
Furthermore, the OPTS rates are set by the oil MNCs without consulta-
tion or participation of the affected communities in the compensatory
process.161 The oil MNC solely sets the rate of payments to be paid to the
affected community or land user and thus, the compensation regime in
Nigeria can neither be considered transparent nor fair.162 However, oil
MNCs often negotiate with the affected communities or their representa-
tives by providing such communities with ‘community development ini-
157. Akpan, supra note 44.
158. Aghalino, supra note 151.
159. J.G. Frynas, Political Instability and Business: Focus on Shell in Nigeria, 19 THIRD
WORLD Q. 457, 460 (1998).
160. Aghalino, supra note 151.
161. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 111, at 71.
162. Id.
31
Ekhator: The Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2016
74 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XXI
tiatives,’163 such as the provision of social amenities, the building of
schools and hospitals or providing potable water in that community.
It is obvious that the various oil-related laws in Nigeria have been de-
signed by the Nigerian state to deprive the Niger Delta people of ade-
quate compensatory payments. The tenor of the compensatory regime in
the oil and gas sector in Nigeria contravenes the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which Nigeria has ratified and
acceded to.  Article 11 of the Convention states that countries that are
parties to the Convention should respect and observe the right of its citi-
zens to have an adequate standard of living. However, this Convention is
observed more in the breach by the Government of Nigeria via the instru-
mentality of oil MNCs in the oil and gas sector. Some of the breaches in
the oil and gas industry in Nigeria of the Convention include the
following:
[H]olders of leases and licences and permits to survey under the
Petroleum Act, Oil Pipelines Act and subsidiary legislation are
entitled to engage in a range of activities – from cutting down
trees and other vegetation, to dredging – without any adequate
safeguards in terms of the impact of these activities on the envi-
ronment and associated livelihoods of the communities.164
The consequence of this is that the human rights of the Niger Delta peo-
ple are being breached and Niger Delta is a cesspool of environmental
degradation occasioned by the lax regulatory regime and the activities of
the oil MNCs. To redress the aforementioned problems inherent in the
compensation regime, the federal government should respect its interna-
tional obligations by adhering to the relevant international conventions.
Furthermore, CSOs should apply pressure on the government to respect
its international obligations.
Arguably, the LUA is not appropriate for analyzing the compensation
regime in oil and gas litigation, especially for oil spills in Nigeria. The
Oil Pipelines Act and the Mining Act provides for compensation related
to oil spills. Section 29(1)(4) – (7) of the LUA expressly vests the com-
pensation regime in the Minerals Act, Petroleum Act or any other legisla-
tion replacing the same. The compensation regime in the LUA is
encapsulated in Section 29(1)(4) – (7). Section 29(1)(4) – (7) states thus:
163. Id.
164. Id. at 24.
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(a) the land, for an amount equal to the rent, if any, paid by the
occupier during the year in which the right of occupancy was
revoked;
(b) building, installation or improvements thereon, for the
amount of the replacement cost of the building, installation or
improvement, that is to say, such cost as may be assessed on the
basis of the prescribed method of assessment as determined by
the appropriate officer less any depreciation, together with inter-
est at the bank rate for delayed payment of compensation and in
respect of any improvement in the nature of reclamation works,
being such cost thereof as may be substantiated by documentary
evidence and proof to the satisfaction of the appropriate officer;
(c) crops on land apart from any building, installation or im-
provement thereon, for an amount equal to the value a pre-
scribed and determined by the appropriate officer.
The above provisions of the LUA are not applicable to oil-related com-
pensation disputes in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. Support for this
view can be gleaned from various provisions of the Oil Pipelines Act.
Section 20(5) of the Oil Pipelines Act states:
In determining compensation in accordance with the provisions
of this section, the court shall apply the provisions of the Land
Use Act so far as they are applicable and not in conflict with
anything in this Act as if the land or interests concerned were
land or interests acquired by the President for Public Purposes.
In analyzing the compensation regime in the oil and gas industry in Nige-
ria, Deinduomo avers that Section 29(1) of the LUA is in conflict with
Sections 11(5) and 20(2) of the Oil Pipelines Act with regards to com-
pensation.165 He makes an important distinction that the Oil Pipelines
Act “provides for disturbance as a vital head of compensation.”166 This
element of ‘disturbance’ in compensation matters is not available under
the LUA.
165. G. Deinduomo, An Overview of the Law Relating to Compensation for Oil and Gas Opera-
tions in Nigeria, in LAW AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: CURRENT CHALLENGES 164 (F.
Emiri & G. Deinduomo eds., Malthouse Press 2009).
166. Id. For the views of estate evaluators involved in the compensation regime and who also
contend that the LUA is not the appropriate law for compensation in the oil and gas industry, see
G.K. Babawale, Emerging Issues in Compensation Valuation in Oil Spillage in the Niger Delta Area
of Nigeria, 2 J. REV. GLOBAL ECON. 31, 34 (2013).
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This article is in support of Deinduomo’s view above. The basis for this
is that the LUA expressly states that in compensation for petroleum and
mining related disputes recourse shall be made to several laws including
the Minerals Act and Petroleum Act, amongst others (Section 29(2)).
Also, the LUA, in Section 1, vests all the land in each state in Nigeria in
the governor to hold in trust and administer for the use and benefit of all
Nigerians. Also, under Section 5, the governor grants statutory rights of
occupancy to all persons with regards to any land in the state. The mod-
ern land owner in Nigeria is a tenant at will. Uchendu elucidates further
on this by stating that the LUA makes the land user in Nigeria “a tenant
at will on state land. . .The land user loses any proprietary interests in his
land and his claims are restricted to improvement he made on land.”167
The state is the owner of the land and such land can be legally expropri-
ated by the government under the LUA for mining or oil-related pur-
poses by virtue of Section 28(2)(C) and Section 28(3)(b).168 The LUA
and the other related oil gas laws have combined to effectively deprive
the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region of adequate compensation for
oil-related damage or exploitation. In terms of access by individuals or
victims in compensation matters, the Oil Pipelines Act grants a right of
access to court for private individuals.169 This right is limited to disputes
in respect of the amount of compensation payable under any provision of
the Act.170
Furthermore, the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations and
the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry
in Nigeria (EGASPIN) also provides for compensation in oil-related mat-
ters. Under Regulation 21(2) of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production)
Regulations (PDPR), “if the licensee or lessee cuts down or takes any
productive tree, he shall pay fair and adequate compensation to the
owner thereof.” Also, Regulation 23 of the PDPR, states thus:
If the licensee or lessee exercises the rights conferred by his
licence or lease in such a manner as unreasonably to interfere
with the exercise of any fishing rights, he shall pay adequate
compensation therefore to any person injured by the exercise of
those first-mentioned rights.
167. Uchendu, supra note 146, at 69-70.
168. However if the government or authority does not comply with the tenets of the Constitu-
tion, such acquisition will be held void by the courts. For an extensive analysis of recent Supreme
Court judgements on land acquisitions in Nigeria, see O.O. Sholanke, Three Supreme Court Cases
on Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Nigeria, 58 J. AFR. L. 266-77 (2014).
169. International Commission of Jurists, supra note 37, at 39.
170. Id.
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Also, Part VIII of the EGASPIN states that “[a] spiller shall be liable for
the damage from a spill for which he is responsible. Settlement for dam-
ages and compensation shall be determined by direct negotiation be-
tween the operator(s) and the landlord(s).” The present compensatory
regime in the Niger Delta has been ineffectual.
Generally, in Nigeria, academics posit that the present compensation re-
gime does not pay fair and adequate compensation to land users.171
Strictly speaking, on the basis of the various laws regulating the compen-
sation regime in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria, the oil MNCs are not
obliged to pay compensation or payment for the loss of value for the land
to the land users.172 Due to the ineffectual public regulatory regime in the
oil and gas sector in Nigeria, communities and other relevant stakehold-
ers have relied on the principles of tort in trying to hold oil MNCs culpa-
ble for their actions in Nigeria.
The next section will focus on the gas flaring occurring in the oil and gas
sector in Nigeria.
C. LAWS ON GAS FLARING IN NIGERIA
In Nigeria, gas flaring is mainly occasioned by the activities of the oil
multinational corporations in the oil and gas sector. The Niger Delta is
the hub of oil and gas exploration and other attendant activities in Nige-
ria. A majority of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta depend on their
environment for their livelihood. Thus, agriculture, fishing and the col-
lection of farm or forest products are the main sources of food for the
inhabitants of the Niger Delta.173 Environmental degradation occasioned
by the activities of oil multinational firms poses tremendous challenges
to the livelihoods of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta. Pursuant to that,
it has been documented that the economic degradation inherent in the
Niger Delta has exacerbated the levels of poverty in that part of
Nigeria.174
The oil and gas industry is a highly technological driven sector of the
Nigerian economy with various environmental problems occurring at the
different stages of oil activities.175 Gas flaring is one of such environ-
171. Aghalino, supra note 151; Uchendu, supra note 146.
172. Akpan, supra note 44.
173. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 111.
174. UNDP, Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006, cited in Amnesty Int’l, supra note
111.
175. Kaniye Ebeku, The Right to a Satisfactory Environment and the African Commission, 3
AFR. HUM. RTS. J. 149-166 (2003).
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mental problems occurring in the Niger Delta. This section will dwell on
the incidence of gas flaring in Nigeria and the various statutes governing
the regime of gas flaring.
Gas flaring has been a recurring decimal in the Niger Delta. Gas flaring
occurs “when oil is pumped out of the ground, [and] the gas produced is
separated and, in Nigeria, most of it is burnt as waste in massive
flares.”176 Thus, in the process of refining, the natural gas, otherwise
known as ‘associated gas,’ is removed from the crude oil being re-
fined.177 The practice of gas flaring can be traced to the activities of the
colonial oil companies operating in Nigeria (before independence) who
allegedly prioritised the economic benefits of their activities over the
harsh consequence of gas flaring.178 Presently, Nigeria flares are the sec-
ond largest amount of natural gas in the world behind Russia; about 2.5
billion cubic feet of associated gas is wasted in Nigeria every day.179
Shell (later Shell-BP), which began exploring for oil in Nigeria in the
1930s (and made the first export), has always engaged in gas flaring
from the beginning of exploitation of oil in Nigeria.180 The present oil
multinationals engaged in the Nigerian oil and gas sector are no different.
Arguably, firms, such as Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, Agip and
Total FinElf, amongst others, which are engaged in joint venture arrange-
ments with the state owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
have exacerbated the incidence of gas flaring in Nigeria.181 These oil
multinationals are violating the tenets of Nigerian law, as would be seen
later in a subsequent part of this section.
The law regulating the incidence of gas flaring in Nigeria is the Associ-
ated Gas Re-Injection Act (hereinafter AGRA),182 which was enacted in
September 1979. The purpose of this law was to compel oil and gas
companies operating in Nigeria to submit their programmes for gas re-
176. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 111, at 18.
177. See Michiko Ishisone, Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta: The Potential Benefits of Its Reduc-
tion on the Local Economy and Environment, (2004), http://nature.berkeley.edu/classes/es196/
projects/2004final/Ishone.pdf.
178. For historical antecedents of the British officials and companies who deliberately condoned
gas flaring in Nigeria, see Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental and Economic
Monstrosity, Environmental Rights Action and The Climate Justice Programme (June 2005), http://
www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/gas_flaring_nigeria.pdf.
179. See Country Analysis Brief Overview: Full Report (Nigeria), U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration (Dec. 2013), http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Nigeria/nigeria.pdf.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Associated Gas Re-Injection Act (2004) Cap. (A25), LFN.
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injection and schedule for the implementation of gas re-injection.183 Sec-
tion 1 of the Act states that every firm producing oil and gas in Nigeria
must submit to the Minister of Petroleum a preliminary programme en-
compassing – “(a) schemes for the viable utilisation of all associated gas
produced from a field or groups of fields; (b) project or projects to re-
inject all gas produced in association with oil but not utilised in an indus-
trial project.” Furthermore, under Section 2 of the AGRA oil and gas
companies were obliged to submit to the Minister plans for gas re-injec-
tion by October 1, 1980 and the deadline for the cessation of gas flaring
was January 1, 1984. Under Sections 3 and 4 of the AGRA, gas flaring is
prohibited except with the consent of the Minister. Also, under Section 3,
any oil and gas company engaging in gas flaring without a certificate by
the Minister is engaging in unlawful activities and such a firm “shall
forfeit the concession granted in the particular field.”
Academics have posited from available evidence that, at the end of 1984,
no oil and gas company or multinational firm has complied with the ten-
ets of the aforementioned law.184 The oil companies argued that the ma-
jor difficulty inherent in the AGRA was the lack of resources to build or
construct re-injection plants within the stipulated timeframe.185 Thus, the
deadline was shifted by a year and about 55% of oil fields were ex-
empted from participating in gas re-injection plans.186 It can also be ar-
gued that there was a lack of will power on the part of the Nigerian
government to enforce the provisions of the AGRA due to the negative
effects it would have on the nation’s economy.187 Thus, the economic
interests of the oil multinational corporations supersede the health and
general wellbeing of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta who are the vic-
tims of gas flaring.
In January 1985, the Associated Gas Re-injection (Continued Flaring of
Gas) Regulations (AGRA Regulation) were promulgated. These regula-
tions are made pursuant to the powers of the Minister in Section 5 of the
AGRA (which relates to the powers of the Minister in respect of the
183. Simon Amaduobogha, Environmental Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in
the Oil and Gas Sector, in LAW AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: CURRENT CHALLENGES 115
(Festus Emiri & Gowon Deinduomo eds., Malthouse Press 2009).
184. EBEKU, supra note 46.
185. Eferiokose Ukala, Gas Flaring in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Failed Promises and Reviving
Community Voices, 2 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 97 (2011), available at http://
law.wlu.edu/deptimages/journal%20of%20energy,%20climate,%20and%20the%20environment/
March%2027,%202011%20-%20Ukala.pdf.
186. Id.
187. EBEKU, supra note 46; see also M. Kassim-Momodu, Gas Re-Injection and the Nigerian
Oil Industry, 6/7 J. PRIVATE & PROP. L. 69 (1986/1987).
37
Ekhator: The Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2016
80 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XXI
conditions wherein an oil company may continue the flaring of gas). Sec-
tion 1 of the AGRA Regulation regulates the issuance of certificates
authorising the continuation of gas flaring in particular fields when the
following conditions are met:
(a) where more than seventy-five per cent of the produced gas
is effectively utilised or conserved;
(b) where the produced gas contains more than fifteen per cent
impurities, such as N2, H2S, C02, etc. which render the gas
unsuitable for industrial purposes;
(c) where an on-going utilisation program is interrupted by
equipment failure:
Provided that such failures are not considered too frequent by
the Minister and that the period of any one interruption is not
more than three months;
(d) where the ratio of the volume of gas produced per day to
the distance of the field from the nearest gas line or possible
utilisation point is less than 50,000 SCF/KM:
Provided that the Gas to Oil ratio of the field is less than 3,500
SCF/bbl, and that it is not technically advisable to re-inject the
gas in that field;
(e) where the Minister, in appropriate cases as he may deem fit,
orders the production of oil from a field that does not satisfy
any of the conditions specified in these Regulations.
Thus, it is arguable that gas flaring is allowed under Nigerian law be-
cause the Petroleum Minister can legally permit the continuation of gas
flaring by oil multinationals if any of the aforementioned conditions are
met by oil companies. The regulations have emphasized economic bene-
fits rather than ending the scourge of gas flaring in Nigeria.188 Further-
more, Kassim-Momodu argues that “the effect of these regulations is the
possible exemption of over 50% of the oil fields from the provisions of
the Act.”189 Also, the fines provided by the law against gas flaring are
minimal190 and the government keeps shifting the gas flaring end date.191
188. EBEKU, supra note 46.
189. Kassim-Momodu, supra note 187, at 84.
190. In 2009, the Nigerian government developed the National Gas Pricing and Supply regula-
tions, which increased gas flaring fines to US $3.50 for every MScf of gas flared. See G. Adeniji,
Approaches to Gas Flare Reduction in Nigeria, Presented at the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Fo-
rum (Oct. 24-25, 2012), http://www.flaringreductionforum.org/downloads/ADENIJINIGERIA.pdf.
191. Engobo Emeseh, The Niger Delta Crisis and the Question of Access to Justice, in OIL AND
INSURGENCY IN NIGER DELTA: MANAGING THE COMPLEX POLITICS OF PETRO VIOLENCE (C. Obi &
S.A. Rustad eds., Zed Books 2011).
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Consequently, gas flaring continues unabated and particularly as the
sanctions do not serve as deterrent to oil MNCs in Nigeria.192
The Nigerian judiciary and the activism of civil society (including
NGOs) in Nigeria have been the bulwark of opposition to the continued
flaring of gas in Nigeria.193 Also, Ladan has argued that Section 234 of
the Criminal Code can be used to protect the Nigerian environment from
the incidence of gas flaring.194 Section 234(f) of the Code states that any
person who causes inconvenience or damage to the public is guilty of a
misdemeanour and liable for imprisonment for two years. However, the
question at juncture is: can oil firms or their officials be held liable for
gas flaring in the Niger Delta on the basis of this provision? The answer
is not clear cut because oil firms can easily evade responsibility since the
sub-section is worded in an ambiguous manner. Also, terms such as ‘oil
firms’ or ‘gas flaring’ are not expressly mentioned in the Section 234, its
sub-sections or other relevant sections of the Act. Furthermore, other dif-
ficulties inherent in the Criminal Code as a bastion for environmental
protection (and gas flaring) in Nigeria include the fact that the penalty of
imprisonment cannot be applied against oil MNCS. Furthermore, the ap-
plicable penalty for violating the code, which is imprisonment for six
months or one year, is not a strong deterrent against gas flaring given the
inability or reluctance of the Nigerian state to prosecute such cases.195
Furthermore, oil MNCs are in continued breach of the statutory provi-
sions of the AGRA by undermining a subsisting court’s decision declar-
ing gas flaring to be illegal in Nigeria.196 The NGOs in Nigeria have
utilised the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights to hold
the Nigeria government and oil multinationals responsible for the im-
pacts of gas flaring and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta.
To redress the devastating impacts of gas flaring and the impunity exhib-
ited by the oil MNCs in reducing gas flares, the Nigerian government has
proposed in the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 2012 that “any licensee
192. See generally U.J. Orji, Moving from Gas Flaring to Gas Conservation and Utilisation in
Nigeria: A Review of the Legal and Policy Regime, 38 OPEC Energy Rev. 149-183 (2014).
193. For example, in Gbemre v. Shell, No. FHC/B/CS/153/05 (Nov. 14, 2005), the plaintiff filed
a suit against Shell, the Attorney General and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)
to end the practice of gas flaring. The court held that the extant gas flaring law “was inconsistent
with the Applicant’s right to life and/or dignity of human person” as enshrined in the Nigerian
Constitution and the African Charter. See Ekhator, Environmental Justice, supra note 48, for an
extensive analysis of the roles of NGOs in improving access to environmental justice in Nigeria.
194. Ladan, supra note 77, at 37.
195. EBEKU, supra note 46.
196. Gbemre v. Shell, No. FHC/B/C/153/05 (Nov. 14, 2005), available at http://www.climate-
law.org/cases/case-documents/nigeria/ni-shell-nov05-decision.pdf.
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who flares or vents gas without the permission of the Minister in (spe-
cial) circumstances. . .shall be liable to pay a fine which shall not be less
than the value of gas.”197 This provision has been criticized by Niger
Delta activists on the basis that most of the oil MNCs that engage in gas
flaring activities are in joint venture agreements with the Nigerian gov-
ernment (via the Nigerian National Petroleum Commission).198 The
question at this point is: will the Nigerian government fine any of its
agencies involved in gas flaring? Also, the aforementioned provision of
the PIB, wherein the fines to be paid by MNCs ‘shall not be less than the
value of gas,’ is ambiguous and open to diverse interpretations. The next
question is: does the government or oil MNCs calculate the value of the
gas flared? Presumably the market value of the gas is fairly easy to ascer-
tain. This provision should be expunged from the PIB. The contention of
this article is that oil MNCs should be held directly and vicariously liable
for the impacts of the gas flaring on the inhabitants of the Niger Delta.
Furthermore, Nigeria has developed many initiatives to discourage gas
flaring by oil MNCs in the oil and gas sector.199 These gas reduction
initiatives in Nigeria are premised on a ‘carrot and stick’ approach,200
which emphasises that oil MNCs be incentivised to engage in gas reduc-
tion and increment in financial penalties if they fail.201 Notwithstanding
assertions by the Nigerian government that gas flaring has significantly
reduced, the prevailing view is that gas flaring in Nigeria is still rife and
Nigeria is one of largest emitters of gas flares in the world.202
There are other laws that are relevant in environmental discourse in Ni-
geria. This section will briefly highlight a few of them. The Harmful
Waste (Special Criminal Provisions) Act203 prohibits the dumping (with-
out the requisite authority) of harmful waste on any land, air and waters
of Nigeria. The Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act204 regulates the licens-
197. Petroleum Industry Bill (2009), cited in Nigeria’s Penalty for Gas Flaring Will Not Curb
Emissions, Say Campaigners, GUARDIAN (May 31, 2012),  http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/
2012/may/31/nigeria-penalty-gas-flaring.
198. Id.
199. Some of these initiatives or mechanisms include the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (Fiscal
Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act, the Associated Gas Framework Agreement (AGPA),
the National Energy Policy and the Nigerian Gas Master Plan (NGMP).  For an extensive analysis of
these government initiatives, see Orji, supra note 192, at 154-61.
200. Adeniji, supra note 190, at 4.
201. R. Ako.& O. Oluduro, Bureaucratic Rhetoric of Climate Change in Nigeria: International
Aspiration Versus Local Realities, in BIODIVERSITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: LINKAGES AT INTERNA-
TIONAL, NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS 13 (F. Maes et al. eds., Edward Elgar Publishing 2013).
202. Orji, supra note 192.
203. Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions) Act (2004) Cap. (H1), LFN.
204. Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act (2004) Cap. (H5), LFN.
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ing and control of activities relating to the refining of hydrocarbon oil in
Nigeria. The Oil in Navigable Waters Act,205 under Section 1, prohibits
the discharge of oil from a Nigerian ship into its territorial waters. The
Criminal Code has various provisions protecting the Nigerian environ-
ment from pollution (water and air) and harmful noxious substances.
The next section focuses on environmental impact assessment in the oil
and gas industry in Nigeria.
D. THE LAW ON ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN NIGERIA
The Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIAA) of 1992 is another
mechanism that enhances good environmental practices in Nigeria.206
This Act serves as a guide on the procedures to be undertaken in consid-
ering the likely impacts of any project whether private or public on the
environment. Also, the various states in Nigeria have their distinct envi-
ronment sanitation laws regulating aspects of environment practices or
sanitation in the states. The Environmental Impact Assessment Act is one
of the few statutes in Nigeria that encourages public participation in the
oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The EIAA is said to be a landmark in the
Nigerian environmental protection regime because it is the first statute
that allows public participation in the decision making processes relevant
to development.207 Thus, members of the public have access to informa-
tion on such projects and participate in the decision-making process on
the potential (negative or positive) impacts on their immediate
environment.
Under the EIAA, oil MNCs (and other relevant project developers) shall
not embark on projects without considering the environmental impacts at
the early stages, except as permitted by law.208 By virtue of Sections
2(2)-(3) of the EIAA, “where the extent, nature or location of a proposed
is likely to significantly affect the environment,” oil MNCs are expected
to undertake an environmental impact assessment of the intended project.
Under Sections 4(d) – (e) of the EIAA, an environmental impact assess-
ment shall include a description of the proposed activities, assessment of
205. Oil in Navigable Waters Act (2004) Cap. (O6), § 1 LFN.
206. Environmental Impact Assessment Act (2004) Cap. (E12), LFN [hereinafter EIAA]. See
generally Allan Ingelson & Chilenye Nwapi, Environmental Impact Assessment Process for Oil,
Gas and Mining Projects in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis, 10 L. ENV’T & DEV. J. 35-56 (2014).
207. Yinka Omorogbe, The Legal Framework for Public Participation in Decision-making on
Mining and Energy Development in Nigeria: Giving Voices to the Voiceless, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MIN-
ING AND ENERGY RESOURCE 565-77 (David Zillman et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
208. EIAA § 2(1)(4).
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the proposed activities, an assessment of the likely environmental im-
pacts and alternatives to mitigate any negative impacts of the project,
amongst others. Environmental impact assessment must be undertaken
on the activities or industries listed as mandatory study activities in the
schedule to the EIAA. The industries deemed as mandatory study activi-
ties under the EIAA include mining, petroleum, transmission activities
and power generation. In respect of mandatory study activities, the EIAA
provides in Section 23 that:
Where the Agency is of the opinion that a program is described in the
mandatory study list, the Agency shall:
(a) ensure that a mandatory study is conducted, and a man-
datory study report is prepared and submitted to the Agency, in
accordance with the provisions of this Decree; or
(b) refer the project to the Council for a referral to mediation or
a review panel in accordance with section 25 of this Decree.
Projects designated as mandatory study activities are vetted and ap-
proved by the Federal Ministry of Environment.209 However, under Sec-
tion 40(1)(b) of the EIAA, the Federal Ministry of Environment has the
power to refuse the approval of a project if it is “likely to cause signifi-
cant adverse environmental effects that cannot be mitigated and cannot
be justified in the circumstances.”
Section 7 of the EIAA allows public participation in environmental im-
pact assessment in Nigeria. Section 7 provides:
Before the Agency gives a decision on an activity to which an
environmental assessment has been produced, the Agency shall
give opportunity to government agencies, members of the pub-
lic, experts in any relevant discipline and interested groups to
make comment on environmental impact assessment of the
activity.
This participatory model has been termed a “pluralist approach to regula-
tion”210 because it promotes the synergy of diverse groups (such as
NGOs, ordinary members of the public and the government) in the envi-
209. OSHIONEBO, REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 90, at 58;
Omorogbe, Public Participation, supra note 207.
210. OSHIONEBO, REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 90.
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ronmental impact assessment discourse in Nigeria. Also, under Section
25 of the EIAA, in mandatory study activities projects, EIA reports shall
be published and made available to the public in selected places and any
person or individual can file comments on the conclusions and recom-
mendations of such reports. Under Section 57, a public registry is ex-
pected to be established by the Federal Ministry of Environment
containing information and records for enhanced public participation and
access to justice. Furthermore, public participation in environmental as-
sessment is pronounced in the review panel stage. Under Section
17(1)(c), comments filed by private individuals are taken into considera-
tion in the review panel. Here, public concerns about the potential envi-
ronmental impacts of a project may prompt the Federal Ministry of
Environment to refer such to a review panel or mediation.211 The Review
Panel accentuates public participation in environmental impact assess-
ments in Nigeria. Under Section 37(b), proceedings in the review panel
stage are expected to be conducted in public “in a manner that offers the
public an opportunity to participate in assessment.”
Under Section 8 of the EIAA, an adequate period is expected to elapse
wherein comments by the public are expected to be scrutinised before
any proposed project is approved or authorised. Also, under Sections
9(1) – (2), the decisions reached must be in written form and made avail-
able to any interested person or group. Under Section 9(3), if no inter-
ested person or group requested for the report, the agency can publish it
in any form wherein members of the public or interested parties inter-
ested in the project shall be notified. It has been argued that the afore-
mentioned provisions are not strictly adhered to in the EIA process and it
is often at the discretion of the project developer.212 Two examples will
suffice to buttress the above assertions. The first case is the Latins State/
Huron Project which was an Independent Power Project (IPP) arrange-
ment between the Lagos State Government (a state in Nigeria), Enron
Power Nigeria Limited and Yinka Folawiyo Power Limited.213 The idea
of the IPP was to improve the epileptic power supply in Lagos State.
Enron Nigeria Limited requested that the environmental impact assess-
ment, which is a mandatory requirement in emergency power barges
projects, should be jettisoned due to the urgency of the project.214
Omorogbe avers that it appears an EIA was not conducted during the
211. EIAA §§ 22(1)(b)(ii), 26(a)(ii), (27)(b).
212. Rhuks Ako, Resolving the Conflicts in Nigeria’s Oil Industry - A Critical Analysis of the
Role of Public Participation (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Kent, United Kingdom).
213. Omorogbe, Public Participation, supra note 207.
214. Id.
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course of the project.215 The second example of Shell Nigeria will also
buttress the assertions that some oil MNCs deliberately avoid engaging
in environmental impact assessment of their projects. Here, it is alleged
that Shell, who is the operator of the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas
Project (NLNG) at Bonny, did not undertake an environmental impact
assessment of the potential impacts of the project. The decision of Shell
not to embark on an environmental impact assessment of the NLNG pro-
ject was challenged in court by a Niger Delta environmental activist. In
Oronto Doulas v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. Ltd., the court held
that the plaintiff (a well-known environmental activist) lacked the stand-
ing to sue Shell with regards to Shell’s failure to observe the provisions
of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act.216
An inherent weakness in the EAIA is that, in some instances, environ-
mental impact assessments can be jettisoned. The Act creates some ex-
ceptions. These exceptions are found in Section 15(1). The Section states
thus:
An environmental assessment of project shall not be required where –
(a) in the opinion of the Agency the project is in the list of
projects which the President, Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces or the Council is of the opinion that the environ-
mental effects of the project is likely to be minimal;
(b) the project is to be carried out during national emergency
for which temporary measures have been taken by the
Government;
(c) the project is to be carried out in response to circumstances
that, in the opinion of the Agency, the project is in the interest
of public health or safety.
The above provisions negate the tenor of the EIAA. For example, not-
withstanding valid objections to a proposed project, the President of Ni-
geria is within his powers to evade the statutory requirements for an EIA
in oil and gas projects. Thus, oil MNCs with access or ‘connections’ to
the President could potentially influence him to give approval to their
proposed projects notwithstanding the negative environmental impacts of
such projects. The discretionary powers of the President should be exer-
cised reasonably and it is contingent on the projects posing minimal neg-
215. Id.
216. Oronto Doulas v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Ltd., No. FHC/L/CS/573/96 (Dec. 15, 1998).
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ative to the environment or public health.217 The question here is: what
are the ‘minimal’ adverse effects of a project? In Nigeria, the answer is
not clear-cut. Citizens of the Niger Delta are not considered and the eco-
nomic benefits of oil and gas projects outweigh the negative environmen-
tal impacts of such projects on the inhabitants of the Niger Delta.218 The
Nigerian courts have followed this economic consideration in many oil
and gas cases.219 In Allan Irou v. Shell BP Development, the court re-
fused to grant an injunction against the defendants from polluting the
plaintiff’s land, creek and fish pond.220 The court averred that such an
injunction will tamper with the operations of the company and have a
negative impact on the revenue accruing to the federal government.221
Frynas contends that the judicial attitudes of judges have changed for the
better and he gave a plethora of cases to buttress his assertions.222 Ako,
on the other hand, avers that Frynas’ views are “overly optimistic espe-
cially when the judicial attitude is considered against the backdrop of
environmental rights litigation.”223 This article contends that the eco-
nomic contributions of oil MNCs to the Nigerian economy outweigh the
negative or adverse effects of their activities according to the federal
government and the judiciary. This article aligns itself with the views
enunciated by Ajomo, who stated that:
In the oil sector where environmental degradation is most prev-
alent, the all-pervading influence of the oil companies and the
paternalistic attitude of judges towards them in matters relating
to environmental hazards created by companies have made the
enforcement of environmental laws ineffective. . .What the
judges fail to recognise is that economic development can be
compatible with environmental conservation.224
217. OSHIONEBO, REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 90, at 59.
218. Ambrose Ekpu, Environmental Impact of Oil on Water: A Comparative Overview of the
Law and Policy in the United States and Nigeria, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 55 (1995).
219. See Chinda & Ors v. Shell-BP, 2 RSLR 1 (1974); Shell-BP v. Usoro, SCNLR 121 (1960).
220. Allan Irou v. Shell BP Dev., No. W/89/71 (Aug. 26, 2008).
221. Id.
222. Jedzei Frynas, Legal Change in Africa: Evidence from Oil Related Litigation in Nigeria, 43
J. AFR. L. 12 (1999).
223. Rhuks Ako, The Judicial Recognition and Enforcement of the Right to Environment: Dif-
fering Perspectives from Nigeria and India, 3 NUJS L. REV. 423, 436 (2010).
224. M. Ajomo, An Examination of the Federal Protection Laws in Nigeria, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 22 (M. Ajomo & O. Adewale eds., Nigerian
Institute for Advanced Legal Studies 1994).
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VI. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
IN NIGERIA
The Nigerian oil and gas industry has undergone changes or reforms in
recent years. This section will highlight some of the recent developments
in the industry. Recently, the Nigerian government enacted the Nigerian
Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010,225 which is other-
wise known as the Local Content Act. It was signed into law in April,
2010. This Act provides that MNCs in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria
should place ten percent of their annual profit in Nigerian Banks and
contract their legal and insurance services to Nigerian firms. Also, the
Act states that Nigerian companies must be the major actors in the issu-
ance of oil fields, licences and in any subsisting contract in the Nigerian
oil and gas sector.226 The Act establishes the Nigerian Content Develop-
ment Agency which has “the responsibility of putting in place a frame-
work for continuous growth of Nigerian Content in the Nigerian
Economy through a balanced programme of planning, target setting,
monitoring, stimulating employment, improving contractor capability”227
amongst others.
Furthermore, there is another law regulating MNCs in the works. This is
the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB),228 which is yet to be passed into law.
The PIB encompasses provisions dealing with the legal and regulatory
framework for the oil and gas sector and to establish rules for the opera-
tion of MNCs in the sector. The intent of the PIB is to consolidate all the
Nigerian laws and statutes into one legislative document.229 The PIB is
expected to increase transparency, accountability and good corporate
governance in the oil and gas sector by removing confidentiality clauses
through competitive bid processes for oil prospecting licenses.230
Nigeria is an active participant in the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI). The EITI sets a global standard for transparency in oil,
gas and mining.231 It aims at promoting transparency and accountability
225. Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act (2010), available at http://www
.oandoplc.com/documents/Development%20act.pdf.
226. Ladan, supra note 77. For an extensive analysis of the local content law see ATSEGBUA,
supra note 70, at 224-243.
227. Ladan, supra note 77, at 39.
228. Nigerian Petroleum Bill, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, http://www.nnpcgroup
.com/pib/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
229. Emmanuel Egbogah, Status of the Petroleum Industry Bill, Paper Presented at the Lagos
Petroleum Club (July 22, 2010), http://www.nigerianoilgas.com/StatusofPIBcolor.pdf.
230. Id.
231. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/node/22 [hereinafter
EITI].
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in payments made by extractive corporations to government and govern-
ment agents.232 In Nigeria the initiative is known as NEITI (Nigerian
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). A number of oil MNCs
that have signed up to this include Chevron Group, BG Group, Shell,
Statoil, Total, CNOOC (China) and ONGC (India) amongst others.233
The EITI Board designated Nigeria as EITI Compliant on March 1,
2011. The NEITI has a secretariat headed by an executive director and a
governing board. The objectives of the NEITI Act 2007 include ensuring
due process and transparency made by extractive companies to the cof-
fers of the federal government of Nigeria, monitoring and ensuring ac-
countability in revenue receipts of the federal government and
elimination of corrupt practices in the payment process in the extractive
industry, amongst others. The NEITI has published audit reports in re-
spect of the oil and gas sector in Nigeria.234 Thus, publication of such
reports can be said to promote accountability and fairness in the oil and
gas sector of Nigeria. However, this is not the case. It is said that NEITI
is “increasingly becoming toothless and institutionally moribund.”235
Thus, NEITI has not achieved much in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.
Corruption in the oil and gas industry and lack of political will on the
part of the government to implement the NEITI, amongst other inherent
difficulties, have accentuated the conundrum.
VII. CONCLUSION
From the analysis of the state regulation of the Nigerian oil and gas in-
dustry, it is obvious that the public regulatory regime in the oil and gas
sector in Nigeria is ineffectual. A major impediment in the regulatory
regime in Nigeria is the lack of political will by the regulatory agencies
to enforce the laws and regulations in the oil and gas sector. A notable
example is that no regulatory agency in Nigeria has instituted civil or
criminal actions against the oil MNCs for breaching the provisions of the
laws in the oil and gas industry.236 This has made the oil MNCs to be
more brazen in their activities and this is exemplified by their non-adher-
232. Id.
233. EITI Nigeria, http://eiti.org/Nigeria (last visited Mar. 3, 2012); Note: the various audit re-
ports have been heavily criticized by the relevant stakeholders.
234. For an extensive analysis of the NEITI audits, see Eghosa Ekhator, Regulating the Activi-
ties of Oil Multinationals in Nigeria: A Case for Self-Regulation?, J. AFR. L. (forthcoming 2016).
235. G. Anthony, The Petroleum Industry Bill (2009) and the Issue of Transparency and Ac-
countability in the Extractive Industry, in ENVISIONING A POST PETROLEUM NIGERIA 146 (G.U. Ojo
ed., ERA Publishers 2010).
236. Engobo Emeseh, The Niger Delta Crisis and the Question of Access to Justice, in OIL AND
INSURGENCY IN NIGER DELTA: MANAGING THE COMPLEX POLITICS OF PETRO VIOLENCE (C. Obi &
S.A. Rustad eds., Zed Books 2011).
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ence to the laws. One probable reason for this is the “dependent relation-
ship between the government and oil and gas TNCs”237 in Nigeria.
Nigeria is said to lack the technological know-how to exploit its vast oil
reserves and more than 70% of its revenue is generated from the oil and
gas sector.238 This dependent relationship, it has been argued, has led to
the capture of the regulatory agencies and the Nigerian state by the oil
MNCs.239 Regulatory capture is especially evident in our previous analy-
sis of the gas flaring activities in Nigeria and the attendant disregard of
some oil and gas laws by the oil MNCs. Thus, it can be argued that oil
MNCs ‘blackmail’ the Nigerian state with threats of divestment away
from the oil and gas sector.  So, the fear is that if the Nigerian state
overly regulates the oil industry, investors and potential investors might
refuse to invest in the Nigerian economy.240 If the oils MNCs divest, this
will lead to loss of jobs in the oil and gas sector and a reduction in the
foreign export earnings of the Nigerian government. However, on the
other hand, if there is proper and effective regulation of the oil and gas
industry in Nigeria, oil MNCs or foreign direct investment will be at-
tracted to Nigeria. The ineffective and inept regulatory regime in the oil
and gas industry in Nigeria could be a disincentive to foreign direct
investment.
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the regulatory regime in Ni-
geria is in need of structural and institutional changes. Due to the anoma-
lies in the regulatory regime, communities and individuals have resorted
to “extra-legal and violent self-help as more peaceful efforts have proved
unsuccessful.”241 The violent self-help or militant activities in the Niger
Delta have been met with full force of the Nigerian state in repressing
such activities. The question at this juncture is: how do we redress the
anomalies in the regulatory regime in the oil industry in Nigeria? One
way of redressing the lacuna in the public regulatory framework in the
oil and gas industry is that the extant laws be amended to reflect views of
stakeholders, including NGOs and oil producing communities. Further-
more, the PIB might have positive impacts on the oil and gas sector when
it is finally enacted.
237. Oshionebo, Civil Society, supra note 1, at 108.
238. Id.; ATSEGBUA, supra note 70.
239. Oshionebo, Civil Society, supra note 1.
240. Id.
241. Emeseh, Niger Delta Crisis, supra note 236, at 66. See also Violet Aigbokaevbo, Environ-
mental Terrorism in the Niger Delta: Implications for Nigeria’s Developing Economy, 2 INT’L EN-
ERGY L. REV. 40 (2009).
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This article has analyzed various legislative enactments governing the oil
and gas regime in Nigeria. Here, laws regulating the oil industry directly
and other incidental laws and regulations were in focus. The first part of
this article focused on the ownership of oil in Nigeria. A historical evolu-
tion of the ownership of oil and mineral resources in Nigeria was at-
tempted. Also various laws and subsidiary regulations, such as the
Constitution of Nigeria 1999, Petroleum Act 1967, Gas Flaring Act, Oil
Pipelines Act and Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations,
amongst others, were in focus.  Other sections of the article included
various themes such as laws regulating the oil and gas industry in Nige-
ria, laws on compensation in oil and gas industry in Nigeria, laws on gas
flaring in Nigeria, laws on environmental protection and recent develop-
ments in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. In analyzing the various
themes in this article, the inherent weaknesses of the laws were brought
to the fore. Recommendations were made, where appropriate, in re-
dressing the weaknesses. However, this article contends that the effective
and efficient enforcement of the regulatory framework by the govern-
ment and its regulatory agencies will be panacea to the inherent weak-
nesses in the present regulatory regime in the oil and gas sector of
Nigeria.
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